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Taking Compliance Seriously 
John Armour,† Jeffrey Gordon,†† and Geeyoung Min†††
How can we ensure corporations play by the “rules of the game”—that is, 
laws encouraging firms to avoid socially harmful conduct? Corporate 
compliance programs play a central role in society’s current response. 
Prosecutors give firms incentives—through discounts to penalties—to 
implement compliance programs that guide and monitor employees’ behavior. 
However, focusing on the incentives of firms overlooks the perspective of 
managers, who decide how much firms invest in compliance. 
We show that stock-based pay, ubiquitous for corporate executives, 
creates systematic incentives to short-change compliance. Compliance is a 
long-term investment for firms, whereas managers’ time horizon is truncated to 
the date they expect to liquidate stock. Moreover, investors find it hard to value 
compliance programs because firms routinely disclose little or nothing about 
their compliance activities. We show that stock-compensated managers prefer 
not to disclose compliance because such disclosure can reveal private 
information about a firm’s propensity to misconduct. As a result, both 
managers and markets are likely myopic about compliance. 
How can this problem be resolved for the benefit of society and 
shareholders? Boards of directors are supposed to act as monitors to control 
managerial agency costs. We show that the increasing use of stock-based 
compensation for directors, justified as a means of encouraging more vigorous 
oversight of business decisions, also has a corrosive effect on boards’ 
monitoring incentives for compliance. Directors in theory face liability for 
compliance oversight failures, but only if so egregious as to amount to bad 
faith. We argue that this standard of liability, established in an era before 
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ubiquitous stock-based compensation for both managers and directors, has 
now become too lax. 
We propose more assertive directors’ liability for compliance failures, 
limited in quantum to a proportionate clawback of stock-based pay. This would 
add power to the alignment of directors’ interests with those of shareholders—
directors would stand to lose more than just a decrease in the value of their 
stock in the event of a compliance failure—but limiting liability in this way 
would avoid pushing boards to overinvest in compliance. We outline ways in 
which this proposal could be implemented either by shareholder proposals or 
judicial innovation. 
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I. Introduction 
It takes your breath away. Over nearly a decade, Wells Fargo, one of the 
largest banks in the United States—and the recipient of twenty-five billion 
dollars in government capital support during the financial crisis—engaged in 
widespread consumer-credit violations across three separate business areas: 
opening unauthorized credit-card and other accounts for existing customers; 
wrongfully charging fees for extensions of home-mortgage commitments; and 
wrongfully forcing auto loan debtors to take on insurance. Millions of account 
holders were affected. As these practices have come to light, the consequences 
for Wells Fargo have been severe, including not only hundreds of millions of 
dollars in fines, but also a cap placed on its growth until its governance, risk 
management, and compliance functions are reordered to the satisfaction of the 
Federal Reserve.1 Wells Fargo’s own special committee investigation 
documented that failures in the bank’s compliance program were a contributing 
cause to the corrosion of the firm’s culture.2 
Wells Fargo is not an isolated example. A series of recent corporate 
scandals all follow a depressingly similar pattern: directors and officers appear 
to have short-changed compliance with law in pursuit of short-term financial 
gains. This behavior is consistent with Volkswagen’s cynical falsification of 
emissions tests for diesel fumes;3 the focus of firms like BP and Duke Energy 
on cost-cutting at the expense of compliance with safety and environmental 
regulations;4 banks’ pursuit of customer acquisition at the expense of 
compliance with anti-money laundering and terrorist financing restrictions;5 
 
1.  Wells Fargo & Co., Docket No. 18-007-B-HC (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
System Feb. 2, 2018) (order to cease and desist). 
2.  INDEP. DIRS. OF THE BD. OF WELLS FARGO & CO., SALES PRACTICES INVESTIGATION 
REPORT (Apr. 10, 2017) [hereinafter WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT], 
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investor-relations/presentations/2017/board-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/96G7-WAEM]. 
3.  See JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER, FARTHER: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE VOLKSWAGEN 
SCANDAL (2017); John Armour, Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal: Lessons for Corporate Governance? 
(Part I), OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (May 17, 2016); John Armour, Volkswagen’s Emissions Scandal: 
Lessons for Corporate Governance? (Part II), OXFORD BUS. L. BLOG (May 18, 2016). 
4.  On BP, see ABRAHAM LUSTGARTEN, RUN TO FAILURE: BP AND THE MAKING OF THE 
DEEPWATER HORIZON DISASTER (2012), and Joel Amernic & Russell Craig, CEO Speeches and Safety 
Culture: British Petroleum Before the Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 47 CRIT. PERSP. ACC. 61 (2017). 
On Duke Energy, see City of Birmingham Ret. and Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47 (Del. 2017), and 
Jonathan M. Katz, Duke Energy is Charged in Huge Coal Ash Leak, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/21/us/duke-energy-is-charged-in-huge-coal-ash-leak.html 
[https://perma.cc/G6XB-6T5D]. 
5.  See, e.g., Michael Corkery & Ben Protess, Citigroup Agrees to $97.4 Million Settlement in 
Money Laundering Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/dealbook/citigroup-settlement-banamex-usa-inquiry.html 
[https://perma.cc/4XC5-KRPZ]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, U.S. Bancorp Fined $613 Million for Money-
Laundering Violations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/business/dealbook/hedge-fund-tax-loophole.html 
[https://perma.cc/6XHB-CVMA]; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Settlement Between Department of 
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and the casual approach that firms like Equifax and Facebook have taken with 
regard to the integrity of personal data.6 In each of these cases, social costs 
have eventually been brought to bear on the firms in the form of enforcement 
(or, in some cases, reputational) penalties associated with sharp stock price 
declines. The problems seem not so much to be strategic decisions benefiting 
shareholders at society’s expense, but failures in corporate governance harming 
both society and shareholders. 
The conventional view of corporate governance is that managers should 
maximize the firm’s value on behalf of shareholders, subject to the constraints 
imposed by law.7 These constraints—known colloquially as the “rules of the 
game”—seek to align shareholders’ welfare with social welfare by imposing 
penalties for socially harmful corporate acts.8 These penalties bite only if they 
are enforced. To facilitate this alignment, prosecutors give firms incentives—
through discounts to penalties—to implement compliance programs that guide 
and monitor employees’ behavior.9 Such programs work to lower the 
likelihood, and increase the probability of detection, of relevant misconduct.10 
However, focusing on the incentives of firms overlooks the perspective of 
managers, who decide how much firms invest in compliance. Stock-based pay, 
 
Justice and Western Union will Provide $586 Million to Victims of Fraud (Mar. 14, 2018), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndia/pr/settlement-between-department-justice-and-western-union-will-
provide-586-million [https://perma.cc/3JHG-YUWZ]. 
6.  On Equifax, see AnnaMaria Andriotis, Michael Rapoport & Robert McMillan, “We’ve 
Been Breached”: Inside the Equifax Hack, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 18, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/weve-been-breached-inside-the-equifax-hack-1505693318 
[https://perma.cc/9BR3-XRW7] and Lalita Clozel, Equifax Ordered by Eight States to Beef Up 
Cybersecurity, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/equifax-ordered-by-eight-
states-to-beef-up-cybersecurity-1530131194 [https://perma.cc/HE9Q-5KAP]. On Facebook, see Deepa 
Seetharaman & Kirsten Grind, Facebook’s Lax Data Policies Led to Cambridge Analytica Crisis, WALL 
ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-lax-data-policies-led-to-cambridge-
analytica-crisis-1521590720u8 [https://perma.cc/MG3U-26HL] and Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook 
Shares Tumble as Growth Outlook Darkens, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-revenue-falls-short-of-expectations-1532549650 
[https://perma.cc/AJY4-T4R3]. 
7.  See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS 2-3 (2012); FRANK H. EASTERBOOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 35-39 (1991); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); HENRY 
HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 23, 53-65 (1996); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 18-27 (2008); John Armour et al., What is 
Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 1, 13-15, 22-24 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
8.  The term “rules of the game” was coined by FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 133. 
9.  Some regulations specify compliance programs that firms must establish ex ante. More 
generally, prosecution and sentencing guidelines suggest more lenient treatment should be offered ex 
post where firms have implemented “effective” compliance programs. These channels are detailed infra 
Part II. 
10.  Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes 72 NYU L. REV. 687 (1997) (finding that compliance regimes rein in 
firms’ informational advantage over regulators and prosecutors regarding employees’ behavior); 
Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse, & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. 
FIN. 2213 (2010) (evidencing significant role of private mechanisms in detecting corporate frauds). 
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ubiquitous for corporate executives, creates systematic incentives to short-
change compliance.11 As the decade-long run of fraud at Wells Fargo 
illustrates, detection and enforcement of misconduct typically take many years. 
Compliance is consequently a long-term investment for firms. Yet managers’ 
time horizon is truncated to the date they expect to liquidate stock.12 
Distortions in managerial incentives created by stock-based pay would not 
be a problem if the present value of compliance investment were taken into 
account in the stock price. A second conventional assumption in corporate 
governance is that the stock market impounds the present value of investments 
into stock prices.13 Consequently, where corporate investments are expected to 
yield value in the future, their present value will show up in stock price today.14 
A successful theory of compliance failure caused by stock-based pay must 
show why markets cannot assess the present value of compliance. 
We show that this logic may fail for investments in compliance. Investors 
likely find it hard to value compliance programs because firms routinely 
disclose little or nothing about their compliance activities.15 We model how 
stock-compensated managers prefer not to disclose compliance because it can 
reveal private information about a firm’s propensity to misconduct: the greater 
a firm’s misconduct risk, the more valuable to it is an investment in 
compliance.16 As a result, both managers and markets are likely myopic about 
compliance. Managers consequently have incentives to underinvest in 
corporate compliance programs. 
 
11.  For prior discussion of links between managerial compensation and compliance failures, 
see Armour, supra note 3 (VW’s CEO had very high-powered financial incentives to pursue corporate 
growth and was in the final year of his tenure); Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance 
Regulation through Nonprosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 355-58 (2017) (demonstrating that 
managers may derive private benefits from corporate non-compliance owing to the structure of their 
compensation). 
12.  See infra Part III. A separate problem arises where managers are paid in stock options. 
With options, managers receive more if the firm’s stock price improves but do not lose more if it goes 
down. This consequently introduces an “upside bias” to investment decision-making. This can lead 
option-compensated managers to undervalue compliance investment, because this does not add value in 
good states but reduces losses in bad states. See infra Section III.A. 
13.  See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 7, 18-19; HANSMANN, supra note 7, 23; 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder 
Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1543-47 (2007); cf. LYNN STOUT, THE 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 63-65 (2012). 
14.  See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 7, at 266 (“[B]asic financial theory indicates that rational 
[shareholders] will fully support any and all long-term investment decisions by companies even if those 
decisions will not result in a payoff for the portfolio company for many years because the expected 
future cash flows will have an immediate impact on a firm’s share price, which is simply the value of 
those cash flows discounted to present value.”) 
15.  See Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 2075, 2100 (2016) (noting that firms are not required to report information on compliance in 
their public filings, such that details of compliance programs are not publicly available). 
16.  See infra Section III.D and Appendix I. 
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A third standard assumption in corporate governance is that oversight by 
boards of independent directors can help to control managerial agency costs, 
including as respects compliance.17 We show that boards’ incentives to engage 
in compliance oversight have suffered a parallel weakening to those of 
managers.18 Directors traditionally received fixed compensation, giving them 
only “low-powered” incentives to engage with the strategic and operational 
decisions of the firm.19 This provoked concerns that boards were too passive.20 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a consequent sea change in directors’ 
compensation practices.21 Directors of U.S. public companies now receive the 
majority of their compensation in the form of stock-based pay, similar to 
managers in structure, albeit less in absolute amount.22 While this gives 
directors more “skin in the game,” encouraging engagement, it paradoxically 
undermines their incentives with respect to compliance, for the same reasons 
we identify for managers. Rather than serving to rein in managers’ excesses, 
boards risk becoming their cheerleaders. 
We argue that the tendency to short-change compliance can be addressed 
through a more assertive potential liability regime for compliance oversight 
failures. Of course, if managers (or directors) knowingly sanction corporate 
crime, then they will face individual criminal penalties. But targeting them for 
criminal liability is difficult because most enforcement measures against 
persons require proof of intent, and knowledge is diffuse within the firm, 
sometimes strategically so.23 The problem of proving individual knowledge and 
intent apparently was the impediment to prosecutions of senior bank officials 
following the financial crisis.24 
 
17.  See, e.g., Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin, & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of 
Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LIT. 
58, 65-74 (2010) (reviewing empirical literature on board assessment of CEO performance); 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, at 50-60 (charting the rise of the “monitoring board” model); Gordon, supra 
note 13, at 1535-40 (same). 
18.  See infra Part IV. 
19.  See Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—
The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 147-48 (1997) (finding that the median 
annual retainer for outside directors was $2,000 in 1962, rising to $6,000 by 1975, $15,000 by 1981, and 
$18,900 by 1985). 
20.  See NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS., REPORT OF NACD BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON 
DIRECTOR COMPENSATION (1995) [hereinafter NACD BLUE RIBBON REPORT] (arguing the need for 
stronger incentives to encourage director engagement); Elson, supra note 19, at 156-64 (arguing that 
fixed salaries cause boards to be too passive). 
21.  See, e.g., Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation 
for Outside Directors on Firm Value, 78 J. BUS. 2229, 2229 (2005) (noting that the number of Fortune 
1000 firms using stock-based remuneration increased from just over 200 in 1992 to almost 500 in 1995). 
22.  See FW COOK, 2016 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION REPORT, 5-6 [hereinafter 2016 FW COOK 
REPORT] (2016); NAT’L ASS’N OF CORP. DIRS. & PEARL MEYER, WHAT’S NEXT FOR DIRECTOR 
COMPENSATION IN 2018?, 7-8 [hereinafter NACD/PEARL MEYER REPORT] (2017). 
23.  See, e.g., SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016), 130-32. 
24.  Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL. REV. 265 (2014). 
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As regards corporate directors’ civil liability for compliance failures under 
corporate law, the current Delaware position was established in 1996 by 
Chancellor Allen in Caremark.25 His well-known opinion articulated two 
things. First, corporate boards needed to assure the existence of: 
 
[I]nformation and reporting systems . . . that are reasonably designed to provide 
to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information 
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach 
informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and 
its business performance.26 
 
But second, design of such a compliance oversight system was a matter 
remitted to the board’s business judgment, since presumably the board, not the 
court, knows best how to shape the firm’s internal compliance activities.27 
Should such an oversight system produce indications of problems—so-called 
“red flags”—then the board was expected to take steps to investigate and take 
remedial action.28 But in compliance oversight design, the board was entitled to 
great deference, limited only by an oversight failure so comprehensive as to 
call into question the board’s good faith. This limiting condition was later 
expansively characterized by the Delaware Supreme Court as an “utter fail[ure] 
to implement any reporting or information controls.”29 
Caremark was an innovation in its time, introducing for the first time the 
idea of a general duty to implement a system of monitoring and controls. Prior 
Delaware caselaw had suggested that directors were “entitled to rely on the 
honesty and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put them 
on suspicion that something is wrong”—that is, a “red flag.”30 Chancellor Allen 
articulated the new oversight standard—an affirmative obligation to ferret out 
red flags—against a background of rapid increases in fines for corporate crimes 
 
25.  In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (Allen, C.) 
(referring to the “increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the criminal law to assure 
corporate compliance with external legal requirements” as well as the value of corporate compliance 
programs under the federal sentencing guidelines). 
26.  Id. at 970. 
27.  As Chancellor Allen put it in Caremark, “Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate 
for such an information system is a question of business judgment.” Id. 
28.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); see In re Wells 
Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp.3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (refusing to dismiss 
counts alleging fiduciary claims against directors); Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 
12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240 (Del. Ch. 2017); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. 
Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative and 
Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
29.  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). 
30.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d at 130. 
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coupled with the introduction in 1994 by the U.S. Sentencing Commission of 
sentencing discounts for firms with an effective compliance system in place.31 
However, we argue that Caremark is no longer sufficient to carry the 
freight assigned to it.32 The corporate governance context has continued to 
evolve, and Caremark’s standard of liability does not respond to the peculiarly 
problematic incentives created for compliance investment and oversight by the 
rise of stock-based pay. The present regime is likely to engender “box-ticking” 
compliance programs, meeting the low hurdle that some sort of “compliance 
program” must exist, but lacking the level of investment necessary to secure a 
real change in behavior. Liability standards must work to offset the incentives 
to avoid compliance with applicable legal rules; they should function as a 
complement that maximizes the value of the firm for shareholders and society. 
The compliance oversight standard of Caremark has become a poor match for 
the greatly intensified incentives of both managers and directors.33 
Moreover, by setting the hurdle for directors so low, the Caremark 
standard effectively precludes judicial consideration of almost all compliance 
issues. This is because of the procedural rules that govern derivative litigation 
in Delaware.34 Unless facing potential liability themselves, directors retain 
 
31.  See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark and Stone: 
Directors’ Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009) 
(detailing the history of Caremark); Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP L. 719 (2007) (same); Donald C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty Year 
Lookback, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 727 (2018) (reviewing developments since Caremark); Elizabeth 
Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 101 (2019) (analyzing cases 
involving Caremark claims). 
32.  The Caremark standard has been criticized on a basis tangential to the one advanced 
here—namely, that its scope should extend also to business risk as well as compliance risk. See, e.g., 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 7, 169-76; Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Reconsidering Board 
Oversight Duties After the Financial Crisis, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 859; Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the 
Board’s Duty to Monitor: A Critical Assessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209 
(2011); . We do not consider this claim here. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate 
Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 
55–56 (2016) (distinguishing shareholders’ challenge to risk-taking associated with legitimate business 
practices from a challenge to directors’ conscious disregard of compliance obligations). 
33.  This is also a lesson from the Enron/WorldCom scandal. Enron’s board failed to detect 
fraud in its financial reports perpetrated by executives desperate to sustain the firm’s stock price until 
they could exercise their (very considerable) option packages. See John C. Coffee, Jr, What Caused 
Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269; JOHN ARMOUR 
AND JOSEPH A. MCCAHERY, AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 1-7 (2006). The lesson is that the use of high-powered 
compensation incentives for executives requires boards to step up to their jobs in a different way. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 responded to this problem by introducing a bespoke compliance oversight 
regime for financial reporting, subject to scrutiny by a firm’s auditors. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial 
Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002). However, firms are subject to a wide array of legal 
obligations that are not so readily identifiable and manageable. In the face of high-powered 
compensation incentives, it becomes incumbent upon us to ramp up the board’s responsibilities and 
liability risk for a greater range of compliance oversight failures. 
34.  Shareholders are required to make a pre-suit “demand” on the board before initiating 
derivative litigation. Unless such demand is “futile”—because of a disqualifying director conflict—the 
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control over derivative litigation aimed principally at the compliance failures of 
corporate officers and employees.35 The high threshold for director liability set 
by Caremark thus screens out, at an early stage, most shareholder efforts to 
establish the facts and seek accountability for compliance failures. In further 
consequence, Delaware courts are cut off from any role as interlocutors and 
duty-setters on compliance and compliance oversight. One of the historical 
roles of the Delaware Chancery Court has been to build out the substance of 
fiduciary duty in wide-ranging contexts, not just by making liability 
determinations but also by developing ideas of “best practice” in the course of 
detailed analysis of particular cases.36 The almost invariable dismissal of cases 
alleging the board’s failure of compliance oversight per the Caremark standard 
has cut off this path for development.37 This has left a vacuum in authoritative 
guidance for best practice in compliance that federal prosecutors have sought to 
fill, increasingly requiring firms to upgrade their compliance programs as a 
condition for settlements.38 Unfortunately, this discretionary “regulation by 
settlement” is seemingly ill-equipped to give boards guidance as to how to 
discharge their responsibilities.39 
 
directors’ decision is final (like any other business decision).The shareholders can take control of 
litigation only where the directors themselves are conflicted—that is, where directors are implicated in 
the circumstances that give rise to the claim (or are not independent from other parties who might be 
implicated) and therefore cannot make a disinterested decision whether to pursue litigation on behalf of 
the corporation. Caremark has set the terms by which director conduct is evaluated as a gateway to 
shareholder efforts to sue managers. See generally R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 13 (3d ed. 2019). Leading cases 
include Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), and Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 
1993). For further development of this point, see text accompanying notes 208-218 infra. 
35.  See supra text accompanying note 34. 
36.  See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (showing that Delaware Court of Chancery combines infrequent liability 
with frequent guidance on best practice for directors); see also Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the 
Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) 
(demonstrating that the tendency of the Delaware courts to review the law in response to new 
developments is a key competitive advantage in the competition for corporate charters); Lawrence A. 
Hammermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1776-
82 (2006) (finding that Delaware’s legislature consciously defers to case-by-case lawmaking by courts); 
Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware 
Corporate Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333 (2009) (arguing that Delaware judges, in opinions and other 
writing, extrajudicially give “penumbral” guidance as to best practice without triggering liability); E. 
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and 
Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 
(2005) (describing the role of Delaware courts in developing law). 
37. See infra Section V.E and Appendix II. 
38. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 
457-60 (2014) (characterizing DPAs as part of a “new policing” of business crime); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 886-902 (2007) (providing data on the use of 
deferred prosecution agreements to mandate increases in compliance activity); Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy 
A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 82-84, 92-99 (2014) (providing data on the use of DPAs to 
mandate changes in corporate governance). 
39.  See Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Deterring Crime Without 
Prosecutor Interference in Corporate Governance, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING 
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We propose more vigorous financial consequences for directors 
implicated in compliance failures.40 This should take the form of a clawback of 
stock-based compensation where there has been a relevant compliance 
oversight failure by directors. A clawback would extend directors’ time 
horizons beyond the point at which the stock is liquidated and realign directors’ 
payoffs with those of the shareholders generally. The clawback should be 
proportionate to the failure and the harm caused to the firm. But in no case 
would directors be liable for more than they have received through stock-based 
compensation. This measured way of assessing liability would minimize risks 
of creating incentives for overinvestment in compliance. 
We suggest two ways forward for implementing this framework. On the 
one hand, we invite the Delaware courts to reconsider the Caremark 
framework, because their guidance on these fiduciary dimensions would be 
highly valuable. This would entail recognition of the directors’ statutory and 
fiduciary duties to assure the firm’s compliance with law, in light of the 
specific compliance risks in the stock-based compensation packages awarded 
by the board.41 But shareholders also have the power to insist on firm-level 
adoption of alternative dispute resolution procedures that would produce the 
same results.42 Shareholders could make use of initiative procedures to 
effectuate by-law amendments.43 Alternatively, they could condition approval 
 
CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 76–81 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. 
Barkow eds., 2011); James R. Copeland, The Shadow Regulatory State: The Rise of Deferred 
Prosecution Agreements, 14 CIV. JUST. REP. (2012). See also Arlen & Kahan, supra note 11, at 375-81 
(critiquing the regulation of firms through DPAs due to the lack of guidance provided). 
40.  See infra Part VI. The Case for a “Compliance Clawback” 
41.  We thus applaud the recent evolution in Delaware law towards requiring a board to design 
compliance oversight in light of a specific regulatory regime that addresses the company’s core 
business. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (mandating a food safety compliance 
regime for an ice cream producer). A post-Marchand case emphasizes this point in denying dismissal 
motion alleging that the board of a biotech firm ignored red flags in botched clinical trials. In re Clovis 
Oncology, No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2019) (compliance oversight is 
“especially” important “when a monoline company operates in a highly regulated industry”). In some 
cases, a firm may be subject to a specific compliance decree that it entered into in order to resolve a 
prior regulatory failure. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 
2320842, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2019) (holding that the Board failed to oversee compliance with a consent 
decree) (“Delaware courts traditionally have viewed stockholder allegations that a board failed to 
oversee the company’s obligation to comply with positive law, or positive regulatory mandates, more 
favorably in the Caremark paradigm than allegations that a board failed to oversee the company’s 
efforts generally to avoid business risk.”); see also text accompanying notes 251-257 infra. 
42.  In setting the standard of care—that is, what should count as a “failure” in compliance 
oversight triggering a clawback—an arbitration-style expert panel could be convened, which could 
usefully assess how well directors performed their oversight functions of assuring a compliance program 
effective for their particular firm and could follow up appropriately on any red flags the program might 
raise. See text accompanying notes 236-237 infra. 
43.  See DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 109. Access to the issuer proxy to present at least precatory 
proposals for such a by-law adoption by the board is governed by SEC Rule 14a-8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8 (2019). 
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of stock-based compensation plans, or otherwise condition their positive 
support of directors, on such procedures.44 
To recapitulate: serious legal violations by corporate actors in which 
responsibility is so diffuse that no one is responsible are corrosive of the long-
term viability of a regime focused on shareholder value. Locating responsibility 
within the firm is important. The directors, as monitors, need to step up. A 
system of expert evaluators of the directors’ performance in compliance 
oversight, combined with appropriate liability limits, strikes a reasonable 
balance. This is a system that shareholders can create even if courts do not. We 
think it would count as a meaningful act of “stewardship” to move forward on 
this proposal, particularly since the stewardship goal is to facilitate long-term 
social wealth maximization.45 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Part II reviews corporate 
compliance programs: their rationale; regulatory incentives for firms to adopt 
them; and the features said to characterize “effective” programs. In Part III, we 
present our model showing how stock-based executive compensation creates 
particularly strong incentives for short-changing compliance, which may be 
harmful both for shareholders and society. Part IV then explains how the move 
to stock-based compensation for directors has undermined their ability to 
oversee the firm’s compliance efforts. In Part V, we turn to the balance struck 
in Caremark, arguing that in light of changes in managers’ and directors’ 
incentives, the original formulation is now too lax. Part VI sets out our 
proposals for a “compliance clawback” determination that would assess the 
quality of the board’s compliance oversight. The final Part concludes. 
II. Why Compliance Matters 
A. The “Rules of the Game” 
Corporations are generally structured so as to give managers incentives to 
generate returns for their investors.46 Clearly, there are many situations where 
firms might profit at the expense of other members of society—for example, 
through releasing untreated pollutants or marketing products that have a 
propensity to cause harm. It is a premise of a well-functioning market economy 
 
44.  Stock exchange listing rules require shareholder approval for public company equity 
compensation plans. See NASDAQ Listing Rule 5635(c) (2019); NYSE Listed Company Manual § 
303A.08 (2019). Recent Delaware cases have indicated that shareholders must ratify grants of stock-
based compensation to directors to bring such director decisions within the business judgment rule. See, 
e.g., In re Investors Bancorp, Inc. S’holder Litig., 177 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2017); Calma v. Templeton, 114 
A.3d 563 (Del. Ch. 2015). 
45. See, e.g., BLACKROCK, THE INVESTMENT STEWARDSHIP ECOSYSTEM (2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-investment-stewardship-
ecosystem-july-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/X62R-N5Y7]. 
46.  See, e.g., HANSMANN, supra note 7, at 53-65 (1996). 
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that firms are effectively constrained from causing such social harms, or 
“externalities.”47 Milton Friedman, who famously claimed that the social 
responsibility of business extended to no more than making profits, was explicit 
in presupposing a set of “rules of the game” that constrain firms from engaging 
in socially harmful activities: “[T]here is one and only one social responsibility 
of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game.” (emphasis added).48 
Provided the rules of the game are appropriately defined so as to control 
externalities, the logic of Friedman’s position is that making profits in ways 
that abide by these rules will necessarily enhance social welfare. 
Thus, regulatory and criminal obligations are commonly imposed on firms 
to ensure that they “pay their way” in terms of the social costs of their 
activities.49 Environmental laws seek to ensure that the costs of industrial 
pollution are internalized by polluters. Workplace and product safety 
regulations set minimum standards for firms with respect to harms to which 
their work environment or products may expose workers or consumers. 
Antitrust laws restrict firms’ pursuit of anticompetitive practices, and laws such 
as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 seek to prevent firms from 
undermining the functioning of public institutions. 
Where firms pay penalties for socially harmful activities, then the 
shareholders are forced to internalize the costs, and managers who are focused 
on profits are thereby also made to focus on compliance. In economic terms, 
the penalty for the firm to pay for non-compliance should be set according to 
the level necessary to make it rational for firms to internalize social costs of 
their activities. This virtuous circle of compliance presupposes that a violation 
triggers enforcement. In practice, the complexity of corporate affairs and the 
finite resources of enforcement agencies mean that the probability of 
enforcement may only be small.50 Under these circumstances, deterrence theory 
 
47.  More technically, social welfare is maximized by encouraging firms to invest in 
precautions against causing harm up to the point at which the marginal cost of additional precaution 
would equal the value of the marginal reduction in social harm. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77-80, 92-94, 177-182 (2004). 
48.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 133. 
49.  Of course, to say that these rules are “appropriately designed” in the sense of optimally 
proscribing socially harmful activities is no straightforward assumption. The capacity of relevant 
institutions to deliver appropriate rules is a central fault-line in debates about market functioning. See 
generally TIMOTHY BESLEY, PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD GOVERNMENT 
(2006) (outlining the conditions under which regulatory intervention is successful); THE POLITICS OF 
REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (emphasizing the importance of the ideology of regulators); 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971) (arguing that regulators 
are captured by the interests of the industry they regulate). See Steven Shavell, The Optimal Structure of 
Law Enforcement, 36 J. L. & ECON. 255, for a discussion of when private law, criminal law, and 
regulation are preferable modes of enforcement. Our concern here is not, however, whether the rules of 
the game are set correctly, but rather how firms are made to observe them. 
50.  See Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case 
(NBER, Working Paper No. 23866, 2017) (concluding, based on the internal corporate documents 
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prescribes a higher penalty so as to set the expected cost of non-compliance 
equal to the social costs of the proscribed conduct.51 High penalties can be 
imposed on corporations in the form of fines and compensatory payments. 
While the $62 billion paid by BP in fines and clean-up costs after its Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill is an outlier,52 the mean corporate fine exceeded $15 million in 
2010, and penalties measured in hundreds of millions of dollars are by no 
means uncommon.53 Where a firm depends on a regulatory license, penalties 
that remove this license can effectively force it out of business.54 
The problem is that very high corporate penalties have real ex post costs: 
jobs may be lost, and firms forced into bankruptcy.55 This provides a rationale 
for corporate compliance programs. The basic idea is that firms are able to 
monitor and control misbehavior amongst their employees far more cheaply 
than are public authorities.56 Because the firm has better information about its 
employees’ behavior than the regulator, this delegation is efficient. 
“Compliance” is the name given to institutions established internally by firms 
in order to carry out such delegated enforcement. Such institutions can reduce 
both the incidence of misconduct and the need for socially wasteful corporate 
penalties. 
 
disclosed in the environmental litigation against DuPont, that polluting was a rational decision based on 
the low probability of enforcement). 
51.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
1969 (1968); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprisonment 
and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. Leg. Stud. 1 (1999); A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The 
Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984). 
52.  Ed Crooks, BP Draws Line Under Gulf Spill Costs, FIN. TIMES (July 14, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/ff2d8bcc-49e9-11e6-8d68-72e9211e86ab [https://perma.cc/ZVJ5-ULFG]. 
53.  See BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 292-93 (2014) (reporting that the average fine in 2010 approached $16 million and that 
the twenty largest corporate fines since 2001 have all exceeded $250 million). 
54.  The prosecution of Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, resulted in its dissolution. The firm 
had employed 85,000 individuals worldwide. 28,000 employees were located in the United States, only 
a few thousand of whom were partners. Concerns about the economic impact of the loss of a regulatory 
license shaped the Department of Justice’s charging decisions relating to the behavior of large banks in 
the run-up to the financial crisis. For example, the DOJ might permit a subsidiary of bank to plead guilty 
to a bank-related fraud rather than the license-holding depository institution or the public bank holding 
company parent or, in conjunction with the plea arrangement, work with other regulators to make sure 
that licenses remained intact. See, e.g., Danielle Douglas, “Holder concerned megabanks too big to jail,” 
WASH. POST, (Mar. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/holder-concerned-
megabanks-too-big-to-jail/2013/03/06/6fa2b07a-869e-11e2-999e-5f8e0410cb9d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/L4GN-48XZ]. For a more recent example, see Andrew Tangel, Jacob Gershman, & 
Andy Pasztor, “Prosecutors Face Complex Path to Charging Boeing Over 737 MAX,” WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/prosecutors-face-complex-path-to-charging-boeing-over-
737-max-11572777000 [https://perma.cc/D478-QKVU] (reporting the concern of prosecutors that 
criminal indictment would “incapacitate” the second-largest U.S. defense contractor). 
55.  See BUELL, supra note 23, at 114-19. These costs are problematic both on efficiency 
grounds (the ex post destruction of value is a deadweight loss) and on fairness theories (many of the 
persons who suffer these losses will not have been culpable in any way). They are also likely to trigger 
political objections to extensive liability. 
56.  Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of 
Corporate Liability Regimes 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
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Firms have since 1994 been offered explicit discounts to any penalties that 
might be imposed for misconduct, provided the firm had previously 
implemented an effective compliance program.57 The best-known channel is 
through corporate sentencing. Since 1994, under the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission Guidelines, the pre-existence of an “effective” compliance and 
ethics program can be taken into account during sentencing to reduce the 
penalty imposed on a convicted firm, currently by up to eighty per cent.58 Less 
visibly, but increasingly significant in practice, effective compliance programs 
are also a relevant factor for prosecutors in deciding whether to bring a criminal 
case against a firm.59 Rather than proceed with a prosecution, authorities may 
instead enter into a “deferred prosecution agreement” (DPA) with a firm.60 
Under a DPA, while the firms admits its criminal wrongdoing and pays a 
substantial monetary penalty, it avoids a formal conviction and the potential 
loss of regulatory licenses.61 And, even if a firm is convicted, the fact that it had 
an effective compliance program in place at the time of the misconduct is a 
relevant factor for government agencies in assessing whether to waive 
debarment of a convicted firm from procurement exercises.62 
In addition to discretionary penalty discounts, there are also specific 
compliance-related obligations for various activities, such as anti-money 
laundering,63 insider trading,64 structural separation within financial 
institutions,65 internal controls over the production of financial information for 
publicly traded firms,66 and checks regarding the making of corrupt payments 
for all firms.67 
 
57.  The rationale is that installing a corporate compliance program may have an ambiguous 
effect on firm value. It will likely lower the incidence of misconduct by a firm’s employees, and it may 
also increase the rate of detection of any misconduct that does occur. However, it is difficult for profit-
maximizing managers to justify expenditure on compliance programs if the effect on the firm’s expected 
liabilities is ambiguous. A penalty discount conditional on establishing a compliance program creates an 
unambiguous benefit, or a “carrot” to induce setting up such a program. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially 
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 833 (1994). 
58.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8C2.5, 8C2.6, 8B2.1 (2016); see Jennifer 
Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321 (2011) 
(arguing that the discounts offered are insufficient to induce compliance). 
59.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9.28.800. 
60.  DPAs have become the primary response to wrongdoing by large corporations in recent 
years. See GARRETT, supra note 53, at 62-67. 
61.  Arlen & Kahan, supra note 11, at 332-33; Garrett, supra note 38, at 859. 
62.  48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a) (2019) (debarment); id. § 9.407-1(a)(2) (suspension). The burden 
of demonstrating responsibility is on the contractor. 
63.  See Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (2018); 12 C.F.R § 21.21 (2019) (requiring 
procedures for Bank Secrecy Act compliance). 
64.  17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2019). 
65.  12 C.F.R. § 44.20 (requiring programs for Bank Holdings Act compliance). On enhanced 
requirements for large banks, see 12 C.F.R. § 44.20(c), and 12 C.F.R. pt. 44, app. B. 
66.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2018). 
67.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 78dd-1 et seq.). 
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B. Effective Compliance Programs 
Discretionary discounts to corporate penalties are available to firms that 
have established “effective” compliance programs before the misconduct 
occurred. But what does an “effective” program entail? In theory, “effective 
compliance” would minimize the sum of the costs of misconduct and of the 
costs of avoiding and detecting such misconduct.68 In practice, there is little 
consensus as to how this should be achieved. When industry participants speak 
of “effective” compliance programs, they generally refer to official stipulations 
as to the features that will be deemed to constitute an effective program; it does 
not necessarily follow that they are actually effective in the sense of 
minimizing joint costs.69 Indeed, despite much exhortation, especially from 
professional consultants who offer to assist in designing compliance programs, 
relatively little is known about the structure and efficacy of corporate 
compliance.70 Our concern here is not how a particular compliance program 
should be structured, but rather how firms are encouraged to put one in place. 
We therefore focus on the structure of “effective” compliance programs as 
envisaged by official stipulations.71 
There are a variety of ways in which authorities can signal to firms what 
sort of compliance activities are expected. The most obvious is simply to set 
out substantive requirements.72 This approach was taken in early sector-specific 
compliance requirements, such as the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act’s provisions 
regarding internal controls to check money laundering.73 Unfortunately, the 
very asymmetries of information that motivate delegation of compliance to 
firms mean that regulators are not well-placed to stipulate how firms should 
 
68.  Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Effective Compliance Programs, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (Jennifer Arlen ed., 2015). 
69.  For critiques of the current approach, See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing 
Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009); Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1216 (2017); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of 
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). Cf. Richman, supra note 24, at 277-78 (noting 
that because the practice of executing deferred prosecution agreements is only ten years old, it may be 
too soon to evaluate their long-run impact). 
70.  See, e.g., Hui Chen & Eugene Soltes, Why Compliance Programs Fail and How to Fix 
Them, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 2018, at 116; Griffith, supra note 15, at 2105-06; Donald J. 
Langevoort, Cultures of Compliance, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933, 933 (2017). Corporations are not 
required to disclose any information about compliance programs under relevant accounting rules, and it 
is rare for them to do so voluntarily. There is considerable debate regarding how the efficacy of 
compliance programs should be assessed, given the obvious difficulties in determining the underlying 
rate of criminal misconduct. 
71.  Given the lack of solid evidence about the functioning of compliance programs, there is 
considerable debate as to how closely, if at all, prosecutors’ stipulations as to what constitute “effective” 
compliance programs relate to what is socially optimal. See Langevoort, supra note 31 and sources cited 
supra note 69. 
72.  See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. 
73.  These mandated a set of “minimum requirements” that covered firms were expected to 
meet. 
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control employees’ misconduct. Substantive requirements consequently lend 
themselves to formalistic or “check-the-box” exercises, widely considered to be 
a waste of resources. 
Another approach is to recruit a gatekeeper. For example, in relation to 
financial reporting, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires public companies’ 
auditors to certify the quality of the firm’s internal controls. This effectively 
delegates the production of detailed standards regarding effective compliance 
to the professional services firms conducting audits (and their regulators). It has 
spawned a large body of doctrine on the part of accounting firms regarding 
compliance, which recent initiatives seek to link to risk management in the 
boardroom.74 
Outside the context of financial controls, the regnant approach for 
prosecutors is to combine generic minimum standards with ex post review of 
the extent and good faith of the firm’s compliance efforts.75 This leaves scope 
to the firm—which has all the relevant information—to determine ex ante what 
sort of activities will be most cost-effective in reducing the risk of misconduct. 
It also permits a much more searching scrutiny than is possible simply through 
ex ante specification. The most comprehensive recent statement of this 
approach is the Department of Justice’s 2019 guidance on Evaluation of 
Corporate Compliance Programs,76 which itself draws on and synthesizes prior 
accounts.77 Key components of an “effective” compliance program include the 
following:78 
Design. Firms are expected to orient their compliance policies in 
accordance with an assessment of which areas of their activities are most 
exposed to compliance risk and in relation to which regulations. Compliance 
 
74.  See, e.g., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, ENTERPRISE RISK 
MANAGEMENT: INTEGRATING STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE (2017); ETHICS & COMPLIANCE 
INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF HIGH-QUALITY ETHICS & COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: 
REPORT OF ECI’S BLUE RIBBON PANEL (2016). 
75.  This review is conducted in the context of misconduct having occurred, and essentially 
asks whether, had the firm taken reasonable additional steps in its compliance program, the misconduct 
might have been caught earlier or avoided. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIVISION, 
EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, 1-2 (2019). 
76.  Id. 
77.  See id. at 1 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 59); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 11 (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/QWU8-SMBP]; 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (Nov. 2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EGH-C5LH]; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 
58; OECD, ANTI-CORRUPTION ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK FOR BUSINESS (2013), 
https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-CorruptionEthicsComplianceHandbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HF6S-7EQT]; OECD, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE ON INTERNAL CONTROLS, ETHICS 
AND COMPLIANCE (2010), https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/44884389.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VM4H-GLR7]. 
78.  This discussion draws on U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 75. 
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policies and procedures should be dynamic: regularly reviewed and updated 
according to changes in regulation or business environment. 
Resourcing. There should be an executive function within the firm 
designated as “Compliance,” to which responsibility is assigned for 
implementing the program (the head of which is often titled as Chief 
Compliance Officer or “CCO”). It should be adequately resourced according to 
the size of the firm and the nature of the risks,79 and enjoy autonomy from, and 
the support of, management.80 
Governance. The autonomy of the compliance function should be 
reinforced by internal oversight and monitoring by the board of directors, 
usually through a committee of independent directors—either the audit 
committee or, where established, a separate compliance committee. A direct 
channel of reporting from compliance personnel to the board is thought to be a 
means of fostering not only autonomy within the compliance program but also 
open upward transmission of information. 
Operational Integration. A key aspect of program implementation is the 
degree of integration with business activities. This includes steps taken to train 
employees about compliance and measures to promote compliance internally 
and communicate compliance externally. It also entails meaningful incentives 
for compliance: most obviously, that persons found to have broken the rules 
should actually be subject to disciplinary proceedings, but, also, the firm’s 
variable compensation policies should not create incentives to flout the rules. 
Integrity. A confidential whistle-blower mechanism is regarded as a key 
reporting channel. Firms should expect not only to have such a system in place, 
but to regularly evaluate whether it is used, and, if so, what happens. More 
generally, compliance programs should be subject to regular internal review 
and testing, by an independent internal audit function.81 
C. Resourcing Compliance 
Given the expected benefits that accrue to firms with effective compliance 
programs, the design of such programs should be regarded as an investment 
 
79.  An ex post review may scrutinize whether the compliance department ever asked for 
additional resources as well as the responses received from management. 
80.  Support can be evaluated by looking for concrete actions taken by senior management to 
demonstrate their support for compliance. Do they themselves follow the precepts established by the 
compliance program? Autonomy raises questions about the compliance function’s stature relative to 
other strategic functions of the firm, and whether it has a direct reporting line to the board as opposed to 
going through senior management. 
81.  Firms should also consider whether to commission an external audit of their compliance 
functions. In the case of internal control over financial reporting, external audits may be required. 
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decision by value-maximizing firms.82 The potential outlays to resource an 
effective compliance program may be considerable. This begins with the direct 
costs of employing compliance staff and training employees regarding 
compliance. Potentially more far-reaching, however, are the costs of integrating 
the program into the firm’s business structure. Done properly, this entails 
careful assessment of the incentives created by aspects of the firm’s business 
model. Particularly important are the way in which performance targets are set 
for employees. Managers seeking to improve results are often drawn to 
implementing performance targets for employees that focus on metrics like 
sales, costs, or task completion. These metrics are chosen because they are 
readily measurable and have an obvious link to the firm’s financial health. 
However, the pursuit of such metrics to the exclusion of other considerations 
has clear potential to trigger failures in other valuable dimensions of 
performance, such as safety measures or compliance with law.83 Most 
employees have natural instincts to be concerned with these issues, but their 
internal ethical or safety concerns can be overcome by sufficiently strong 
financial incentives.84 As a result, the compliance implications of performance 
targets are a joint function of the definition of the targets themselves and the 
intensity of the financial incentives—in terms of rewards (penalties) for 
meeting (missing) targets. 
For example, prior to the financial crisis, it was widespread in the 
financial sector for employees to receive most of their income based on 
“narrow” performance metrics such as sales or revenues.85 It became clear that 
sales-based compensation led employees to shift products to clients that were 
not in clients’ interests; indeed, this was the core of the problem in the Wells 
 
82.  See, e.g., Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into 
Competitive Advantage, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 285 (2017) (advocating an “efficient investment-risk” 
approach to compliance). 
83.  For example, Wells Fargo’s use of aggressive sales-based performance targets for 
employees was a major factor in the “false sales” scandal that emerged. See WELLS FARGO 
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 2. 
84.  See, e.g., BRUNO FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL 
MOTIVATION (1997) (discussing a possible crowding-out by “extrinsic” motivation, such as financial 
incentives, of “intrinsic” motivation, such as altruism and ethical concern); Alain Cohn, Ernst Fehr & 
Michel André Maréchal, Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry, 516 NATURE 86 
(2014) (offering experimental results that suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking 
industry undermines norms of honesty); Sverre Grepperud & Pal Andreas Pedersen, Crowding Effects 
and Work Ethics, 20 LABOUR 125 (2006) (stating that, where crowding-out is present, optimal contracts 
may need to forego financial incentives); Jared Harris & Philip Bromiley, Incentives to Cheat: The 
Influence of Executive Compensation and Firm Performance on Financial Misrepresentation, 18 ORG. 
SCI. 337 (2007) (providing a theory and empirical results showing a link between incentive 
compensation for senior managers and misrepresentation of financial statements). 
85.  See, e.g., Reforming Remuneration Practices in Financial Services (Fin. Servs. Auth. 
(UK), Consultation Paper No. 09/10, 2009). 
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Fargo scandal.86 Moreover, revenue-based compensation for traders generated 
incentives to overlook risks associated with the positions taken that might 
materialize in subsequent periods.87 
Similar considerations operate at the level of recruitment. Firms that take 
compliance seriously will instigate background checks for new employees and 
be particularly chary about recruiting personnel with prior documented failings 
on any of the relevant compliance dimensions. Firms implementing less 
stringent checks will be likely to recruit a higher proportion of employees with 
prior misconduct records. In some contexts, this may actually boost the firm’s 
profitability in the short run.88 
Effective compliance programs thus require firms to assess how the firm’s 
employee recruitment and performance metrics are likely to impact incentives 
to obey applicable regulation. Taking full account of the compliance 
implications of these variables may necessitate significant modifications, 
dulling the performance impact of the incentive schemes. As a consequence, 
effective compliance can easily prove costly. For a value-maximizing firm, the 
extent to which such costs are worth occurring is an investment decision: a 
function of the expected benefit in terms of reduced exposure to penalties. 
Unfortunately, as Part III explains, compensation practices for executives tend 
to bias management incentives towards underinvestment in compliance. 
While it seems clear that many firms have implemented compliance 
programs,89 there is a dearth of quantitative empirical literature on corporate 
compliance activities. This absence is because firms rarely include the details 
of their compliance activities in public disclosure.90 The limited available 
information comes through practitioner surveys, typically conducted by large 
accounting firms, which have developed compliance consulting practices.91 The 
reliability of such surveys is open to question. For example, PwC’s annual State 
 
86.  See WELLS FARGO INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS REPORT, supra note 2. In this setting, 
“compensation” means not only immediate dollar payments but also promotion opportunities on the 
upside and retention risk on the downside. 
87.  A thoughtful study by Archarya, Litov and Sepe reports that the extent to which 
employees’ compensation varied with financial firms’ performance was strongly correlated with risk-
taking before the financial crisis and poor financial performance in the crisis. Viral Acharya, Lubomir P. 
Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Seeking Alpha, Taking Risks: Evidence from Non-Executive Pay in US Bank 
Holding Companies, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 2565, 2604 (2016). See also Simone M. Sepe & Charles 
Whitehead, Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 658 
n.12 (2015) (citing sources on the effect of nonexecutive compensation on bank risk). 
88.  See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for Financial Adviser 
Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233, 233 (2017) (documenting that financial advisors who are fired for 
misconduct are likely to be re-hired by firms that themselves have higher overall rates of misconduct, 
which in turn specialize in areas with high proportions of unsophisticated clients). 
89.  See Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, The Hidden Power of Compliance, 103 MINN. L. 
REV. 2135, 2146 (2019) (referring to the “explosive growth” of compliance departments over the past 
decade). 
90.  See Griffith, supra note 15, at 2100. 
91.  See id., at 2100-06 (summarizing the information in practitioner surveys). 
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of Compliance report, a widely cited source,92 reported in 2016 that 20% of 
companies have a board-level compliance committee.93 For a separate paper on 
compliance committees, we analyzed data provided by BoardEx on the board 
structures of public companies and learned that in 2016 only 3.2% of public 
companies had stand-alone compliance committees; expanding the definition to 
include any board committee with “compliance” in its name (like “Audit and 
Compliance”) increased the population of firms with such a committee to 
5.0%.94 Our results suggest that the selection bias in practitioner surveys is 
likely to overstate the extent of compliance activity among public companies. 
III. Short-Changing Compliance 
A. Stock-Based Compensation 
Stock-based compensation is now ubiquitous for senior U.S. corporate 
executives.95 There are two principal types: stock options, and restricted stock 
awards (“RSUs”). Options give executives the right to buy the firm’s stock at 
specified times at a specified “strike” price. Awards of restricted stock pay 
executives with stock, which they are required to hold for a specified period 
(hence “restricted”). In each case, the value of the award to the executive 
increases as the firm’s stock price improves; this design creates a powerful 
alignment between the executive’s interests and those of stockholders, focusing 
the executive’s mind on actions that will improve the stock price. The 
difference between options and RSUs is on the downside: if the stock price 
falls below the option exercise price, options may expire “out of the money,” 
whereas RSUs will retain value. Stock options may seem to encourage more 
risk-taking (since the downside is capped), but performance vesting for RSUs 
and performance-tied additional grants of RSUs can produce compensation of 
similar incentive power.96 A shift from options to RSUs beginning in the early 
 
92.  See Bird & Park, supra note 82, at 287; Griffith, supra note 15, at 2100-05; Joseph E. 
Murphy, Policies in Conflict: Undermining Corporate Self-Policing, 69 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 421, 423 
(2017). 
93.  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, STATE OF COMPLIANCE STUDY 2016: LAYING A STRATEGIC 
FOUNDATION FOR STRONG COMPLIANCE RISK MANAGEMENT 15 (2016), https://www.pwc.se/sv/pdf-
reports/state-of-compliance-study-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS3M-P6XG]. 
94.  John Armour, Brandon Garrett, Jeffrey N. Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Board Compliance, 
104 MINN. L. REV. 1191 figs. 1 & 2 (2020). 
95.  See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004); Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and 
Corporate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8 (2013); 
Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in HANDBOOK OF 
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 211 (George Constantinides, Milton Harris, & René Stulz eds. 2013). 
96.  See JAMES REDA ET AL., Study of 2015 Short-Term and Long-Term Incentive Design 
Criteria Among Top 200 S&P 500 Companies 5, 11,12 (Working Paper 2016) (noting an increasing shift 
to performance-based awards, motivated in part by ISS policy on say-on-pay review). 
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2000s was driven principally by the loss of exceptionally favorable accounting 
treatment for options.97 
In this Part, we show that, just as high-powered performance pay for 
employees may create risks for compliance, high-powered performance pay for 
executives creates incentives to underinvest in compliance programs overall. 
This is likely to manifest itself in compliance programs that are more “check 
the box” in form: inadequately resourced, lacking in operational autonomy, and 
poorly integrated into business operations. While discussion of perverse side-
effects of high-powered incentive compensation has been with us at least since 
Enron,98 the implications for compliance have not previously been analyzed 
closely. They turn out to be particularly grave. We consider two ways in which 
stock-based pay can encourage managers to underinvest in compliance, and 
then explain why the market is unable to see through this problem. 
B. Managerial Myopia About Compliance 
The first problem concerns a divergence in time horizon. Managers who 
have stock-based pay—whether RSUs or options—will care about the stock 
price, but only over the time period for which they hold the stock. The 
foreshortening of the manager’s time horizon can create divergences of interest. 
Actions that boost the firm’s stock price in the short run but harm it in the long 
run may appeal to managers (but ultimately hurt investors).99 Effective 
compliance programs require firms to incur costs in the short term in return for 
a reduction in expected penalties in the medium to long term.100 However, if 
investors cannot readily determine the relevant attributes of the firm’s 
compliance program,101 then the stock price will not fully reflect the expected 
benefit to the firm of compliance investment as it is made. Rather, the benefit 
will only be quantifiable when and if enforcement actually occurs—by which 
time, of course, it is too late. Given these conditions, executives paid in stock 
 
97.  See Murphy, supra note 95, at 226 fig.4, 227 fig.5 & 228 fig.6. Murphy traces the shift in 
the composition of executive compensation over the period from 1992 to 2011, showing a marked rise in 
stock-based pay but also showing a shift in the latter half of the period from stock options to restricted 
stock. Earlier in the period, options typically were not expensed, meaning they were “free” in accounting 
terms. Shareholder pressure and, later, a change in accounting rules (FAS 123R) subsequently required 
such expensing. Id. at 297-98. Murphy describes the favorable accounting treatment of performance-
based share grants. Id. at 298. 
98.    See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr, What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic 
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Gary Giroux, What Went Wrong? Accounting 
Fraud and Lessons from the Recent Scandals, 75 SOC. RES. 1205 (2008). 
99.   See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 95, at 183-85. 
100.  As we have seen, these are not just the direct costs of compliance personnel, but can 
extend deeply into a firm’s business model, including the opportunity cost—in terms of short-term 
profitability—of using very high-powered incentive compensation schemes for employees. See supra 
Section II.B. 
101.  This assumption is defended in Section III.B. 
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over a finite time horizon will tend to behave myopically with respect to 
compliance, discounting excessively its benefits to the firm. 
To see this, assume that a CEO is paid in stock that vests over a six-year 
period. At the end of this period, the CEO sells her stock, quite possibly leaving 
the firm.102 Assume further that, owing to its business model and regulatory 
environment, her firm has a five percent risk in any given year of being 
investigated for misconduct by its employees. This risk captures the combined 
effect of the employees’ propensity for misconduct and the chance of detection 
and enforcement by authorities. While it is conventional to describe 
enforcement risk as a probability, the more accurate description is that it is a 
hazard rate—the probability of a firm being investigated in any given year.103 
Assume for simplicity that the hazard rate remains constant from year to 
year.104 Figure 1 shows the cumulative probability that enforcement will have 
occurred within a particular number of years from today, given an annual 
hazard rate of five percent.105 Bearing in mind that the firm’s expected penalty 
at t = 0 is the actual enforcement penalty multiplied by the probability of 
enforcement, we can understand the cumulative probability function as 
modelling how the firm’s expected cost of enforcement evolves over time. As 
the cumulative probability of enforcement increases over time, the firm’s 
expected enforcement cost also increases.106 Investment in an effective 
compliance program could reduce the cost to the firm of enforcement. The size 
of the potential enforcement cost provides a benchmark against which to assess 
the extent to which compliance investment is in shareholders’ interests. 
 
 
102.  Studies suggest the average CEO can expect to hold her job for roughly six years. See 
Kaplan, supra note 95, at 15. 
103.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER J. MCNEIL, RÜDIGER FREY & PAUL EMBRECHTS, QUANTITATIVE 
RISK MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS 391-94 (2015). 
104.  That is, the probability of enforcement occurring has an exponential distribution. We 
relax this assumption below. See infra text accompanying note 109. 
105.  The cumulative distribution function P(t) represented in the plot takes the form 
𝑃 = 𝑝𝑒!!" . 
106.  This is because the expected cost to the firm of enforcement is a function of the actual 
cost of enforcement (penalties, etc) discounted by the probability that enforcement will not occur. See 
sources cited supra note 51. 
  




Figure 1. Cumulative probability of enforcement with constant hazard rate of five 
percent. 
 
The dotted vertical line at t = 6 shows the time horizon of a CEO who 
holds stock only for the first six years from the starting point. The continued 
growth in the cumulative probability of enforcement after six years will not 
affect her payoffs. The potential benefit to the manager of investment in 
compliance over her period of stock ownership is considerably less than the 
potential benefit to shareholders over the long-term. Because the manager does 
not share in the full benefit to the firm, which increases over time, the manager 
can improve her returns by underinvesting in compliance and transferring the 
resources into substitute projects that will deliver greater results within her time 
horizon. 
Of course, the expected costs modeled by the cumulative probability line 
are expressed in future dollars. Compliance expenditure must be incurred in 
present dollars. It is elementary corporate finance that future cash flows are 
discounted to present value in order to determine the net present value of an 
investment.107 The lower curve illustrates the effect of discounting the expected 
payments to present value, using a discount rate of five percent.108 A crude 
interpretation of the impact of discounting would be that although the firm may 
face a high cumulative probability of enforcement over a long period of time, it 
does not need to devote large amounts of resources to the problem today 
because it may have other projects with a higher net present value (NPV) that it 
can pursue, the proceeds of which it can use to cover any future liabilities. As 
 
107.  See, e.g., RICHARD BREALEY, STEWART MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 19-27, 132-39 (12th ed. 2017). 
108.  In the current market environment, this discount rate is high, consequently under-
representing the expected cost to the firm of enforcement. 
  
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:1 2020 
24 
Figure 1 illustrates, discounting does not solve the problem of the CEO’s 
truncated time horizon. The expected cost, even discounted to present value, 
continues to rise until after year ten. 
This point is even starker if, rather than assuming a constant probability of 
enforcement, we consider a case where the annual probability of enforcement 
(the “hazard rate”) is rising over time, as illustrated by Figure 2. While a 
constant annual probability of enforcement might be appropriate for potential 
isolated incidents of misconduct, an increasing annual hazard rate might be 
more appropriate for thinking about misconduct that grows in scale over time 




Figure 2. Cumulative probability of enforcement with hazard rate 
increasing annually by one percent. 
 
More fundamentally, the crude interpretation of the impact of discounting 
overlooks the firm’s need to manage its liquidity.109 Imagine a firm’s managers 
decide, on the basis of the crude discounting approach, that they will not invest 
resources in a compliance program but rather in an alternative project that 
yields a higher NPV. Their reasoning is that the alternative project will yield 
more, in present value terms, than an investment in an effective compliance 
program, once the future benefits of the latter are discounted to present value. 
Yet the timing of the cash outflow triggered by an enforcement action is hard to 
 
109.  See, e.g., Tim Opler, Lee Pinkowitz, René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, The Determinants 
and Implications of Corporate Cash Holdings, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1999). 
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predict, making it difficult for the managers to know whether the alternative 
project’s payoffs will be available to fund it. If the firm does not have the cash 
available to pay the penalties, then it will need to engage in costly liquidation 
of assets or incur costly refinancing. A liquidity shortfall so severe as to make a 
firm unable to pay debts as they fall due is likely to trigger bankruptcy.110 In 
any case, a liquidity shock can harm a firm’s ability to make investments, 
especially in R&D.111 Ordinarily, firms manage the risks associated with 
unpredictable adverse liquidity events using insurance or derivatives.112 
However, this recourse is prohibited in relation to most forms of corporate 
misconduct. Thus a net present value calculation of the benefits of investment 
in compliance puts only a lower bound on its value to the firm’s shareholders. 
C. Upside Bias Devalues Compliance 
The time-horizon problem discussed in Section III.B is common to all 
forms of stock compensation, both RSUs and options. However, there is an 
additional way that option compensation in particular creates a tendency for 
executives to undervalue compliance programs. While options motivate 
executives to pursue risky business ventures by increasing the payoff associated 
with good outcomes, the value of the options to the executive does not continue 
to decrease once the stock price falls below the strike price, so the manager is 
indifferent to the benefits to shareholders of activities that reduce the loss 
suffered to the firm in bad states (such as investment in compliance, or more 
generally, insurance against low-probability, high-impact events). For the 
valuation of an option package priced near the current stock price, the 
difference between a “bad” impact on the stock and a “worse” impact is 
irrelevant: the options will be out of the money in either case. Consequently, a 
manager paid purely in options may prefer to substitute resources away from 
compliance investment (which produces no benefit to her) in favor of projects 
that are likely to increase the stock price. In contrast to the time-horizon 
problem analyzed in Section III.B, options distort managerial investment 
 
110.  See, e.g., René Stulz, Rethinking Risk Management, 9 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 8, 12-13 
(1996); Sheen Liu, Peter Woodlock, Howard Qi & Yan Alice Xie, Cash Reserve and Venture Business 
Survival Probability, 11 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 123 (2006) (finding that start-up businesses with 
higher cash-flow volatility are more likely to fail). 
111.  See, e.g., Bernadette A. Minton & Catherine Schrand, The Impact of Cash Flow 
Volatility on Discretionary Investment and the Costs of Debt and Equity Financing, 54 J. FIN. ECON. 
423, 453 (1999) (finding that greater cash flow volatility is associated with increased financing costs); 
see also Meike Ahrends, Wolfgang Drobetz & Tatjana Xenia Puhan, Cyclicality of Growth 
Opportunities and the Value of Cash Holdings, 37 J. FIN. STABILITY 74, 74 (2018) (finding that 
corporate cash holdings are more valuable for companies with less procyclical growth opportunity, 
especially for companies with low leverage and high R&D); Jeff Zeyun Chen & Philip B. Shane, 
Changes in Cash: Persistence and Pricing Implications, 52 J. ACC. RES. 599, 601 (2014) (finding that 
unexpected cash flow reductions trigger “severe[]” declines in market price). 
112.  See Stulz, supra note 110. 
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incentives even where the managers and shareholders share the same time 
horizon. 
The tendency of options to induce excessive focus on “upside” is well-
documented. For example, executive stock options have been reported to 
contribute to accounting manipulation113 (including the Enron scandal),114 bank 
risk-taking prior to the financial crisis,115 and underinvestment in safety 
precautions.116 Their adverse incentives for compliance have also been noted.117 
However, the perverse effects of stock options are just one aspect of the 
broader problems for compliance associated with stock-based compensation, 
which encompass all forms of compensation that are geared to stock price 
appreciation. The problem cannot be resolved simply by eschewing the use of 
options in executive compensation in favor of restricted stock. 
D. Market Myopia About Compliance 
The foregoing analysis holds only if investors cannot readily determine 
whether a firm’s compliance program is “effective” such that it would merit a 
reduction in penalties conditional on enforcement, or, more generally, if 
investors are unable to determine whether a company’s business model 
(including compliance measures) presents above-average compliance risks. If 
investors could make such a determination, then managers would have little to 
gain from myopic or upside-biased underinvestment in corporate compliance. 
Investors would anticipate the loss in value associated with such 
underinvestment, and the stock price would fall. This awareness would lower 
the value of stock-based compensation today. Sophisticated investors can and 
do make such adjustments in reaction to many strategic decisions by 
executives. Their ability to do so acts as a countervailing force that constrains 
concerns about managerial myopia and upside bias in many contexts.118 The 
 
113.  See Andrew C. Call, Simi Kedia & Shivaram Rajgopal, Rank and File Employees and 
the Discovery of Misreporting: The Role of Stock Options, 62 J. ACC. & ECON. 277 (2016); Hermann 
Achidi Ndofor, Curtis Wesley & Richard L. Priem, Providing CEOs With Opportunities to Cheat: The 
Effects of Complexity-Based Information Asymmetries on Financial Reporting Fraud, 41 J. MGMT. 1774 
(2013); Xiaomeng Zhang et al., CEOs On the Edge: Earnings Manipulation and Stock-Based Incentive 
Misalignment, 51 ACAD. MGMT. J. 241 (2008). 
114.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the 
Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); see also 
Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. 
FIN. ECON. 35 (2006). 
115.  See John Armour, Bank Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE 1108 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018). 
116.  Adam J. Wowak, Michael J. Mannor & Kaitlin D. Wowak, Throwing caution to the 
wind: The effect of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product safety problems, 36 STRATEGIC 
MGMT. 1082 (2015). 
117.  Arlen & Kahan, supra note 11. 
118.  Indeed, the evidence that the shorter a CEO’s tenure, the more intensely RSUs encourage 
risk-taking—consistent with the foreshortening effect of the time horizon—can be interpreted as positive 
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question is therefore whether compliance differs in any way from other 
investments that makes it particularly hard for investors to assess its value. 
The same question can be viewed from the other end of the telescope. It 
has long been appreciated in theory that if markets find some types of 
investment particularly hard to value, it will distort the incentives of managers 
who focus on the stock price.119 A growing body of evidence suggests that the 
value of investment in R&D activity is harder for markets to assess—by virtue 
of its very novelty—than more straightforward capital expenditure.120 If other 
investments are also imperfectly assessed by the market, is there anything 
unique about compliance? Our analysis suggests the answer is yes, whichever 
way the question is posed. Compliance investment turns out to be especially 
difficult for the market to assess, making the time-horizon and upside-bias 
problems we have described particularly intense in this context. 
Clearly, there are technical challenges to understanding the detail of how a 
firm’s compliance program operates. Yet similar challenges are present in 
understanding the technical nature of most firms’ business operations, and 
these do not prevent analysts from providing an assessment.121 The difference 
with compliance is that the extent to which a firm must invest to yield an 
“effective” compliance program is likely to be a function of the firm’s 
underlying misconduct risk, which cannot credibly be revealed to the market, 
and which many firms prefer not to reveal in any event. Consequently, firms 
that have a higher-than-average risk of misconduct have incentives to seek to 
hide this information by disclosing no more than the average level of 
compliance expenditure and other compliance-related activity. 
To see this, consider the following numerical example (a more general 
model is set out in Appendix I). Assume that there are two time periods. At the 
beginning of the first period (t = 0), there are two types of firm, with variations 
 
for shareholders if markets are able to assess the long-term implications of investment in this way. See 
Wanrong Hou & Steven R Lovett, Stock-Based Incentives and CEO Tenure: Their Effects on Risk-
Taking and Performance Extremeness, ACAD. MGMT. PROC., Aug. 1, 2017. 
119.  See, e.g., John M. Bizjak, James A. Brickley & Jeffrey L. Coles, Stock-based Incentive 
Compensation and Investment Behaviour, 16 J. ACC. & ECON. 349 (1993); Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient 
Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104 Q. J. ECON. 655 
(1989). 
120.  See, e.g., Jie He & Xuan Tian, The Dark Side of Analyst Coverage: The Case of 
Innovation, 109 J. FIN. ECON. 856 (2013) (finding that an exogenous reduction in analyst coverage was 
associated with an increase in innovation); Vivian W. Fang, Xuan Tian & Sheri Tice, Does Stock 
Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation?, 69 J. FIN. 2085 (2014) (finding that exogenous 
increases in liquidity were associated with subsequent declines in innovation in affected firms); Shai 
Bernstein, Does Going Public Affect Innovation?, 70 J. FIN. 1365 (2015) (finding that firms that 
undertake IPOs reduce innovation, measured by patent citations, relative to firms that pull their IPOs for 
exogenous reasons). See generally JONATHAN HASKEL & STIAN WESTLAKE, CAPITALISM WITHOUT 
CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE INTANGIBLE ECONOMY 169-74 (2018) (reviewing literature); John Armour 
& Luca Enriques, Financing Disruption 22-25 (Oxford Univ., Working Paper 2017) (reviewing 
literature). 
121.  See generally Mark T. Bradshaw, Analysts’ Forecasts: What Do We Know after Decades 
of Work? (Boston College, Working Paper 2011) (reviewing literature regarding analyst activity). 
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in their business practices affecting their propensity to experience employee 
misconduct and subsequent prosecution. “High-risk” firms compensate 
employees with aggressively loaded performance bonuses and implement only 
very lax checks on employee backgrounds during recruitment. “Low-risk” 
firms deploy only more moderate compensation incentives, and their 
employees undergo thorough screening prior to being hired. These differences 
mean high-risk firms have greater probability of being investigated and 
penalized for employee misconduct. Assume that managers know their firms’ 
risk types, but investors do not. Assume further that 10% of firms are high risk, 
the remaining 90% are low risk, and that these proportions are known to both 
investors and managers. 
At the end of the second period (t = 2), firms may be investigated by the 
authorities, which will reveal any misconduct. This delay reflects the intuition 
that there is often a long lead time before enforcement. Firms found by the 
authorities to have engaged in misconduct must then pay a penalty, the 
expected cost of which has a mean of $10 million.122 Assume that for high-risk 
firms the probability of being investigated and penalized in the second period is 
0.5 and for low-risk firms it is 0.1.123 
Firms may choose to implement an effective compliance program at the 
end of the first period (t = 1). Any firm subsequently penalized by the 
authorities that has in place an effective compliance program receives a 
discount of 50%, being required to pay only $5 million by way of penalty.124 As 
we have seen in Section II.C, implementing an effective compliance program 
requires integration with a firm’s business. Consequently, it is costlier for high-
risk firms to implement effective compliance programs than for low-risk firms. 
In our example, the high-risk firms must change their recruitment and 
compensation practices (or hire teams of internal auditors for close monitoring 
of employee conduct) which has an adverse impact on revenues. Assume that 
the cost of implementing an effective compliance program is $600,000 for 
high-risk firms and only $200,000 for low-risk firms. 
We assume all parties to be risk neutral, and the time value of money to be 
nil. Recall that for any firm that is penalized, having an effective compliance 
program in place reduces the penalty by $5 million. The expected benefit to a 
firm of implementing an effective compliance program is therefore a function 
of that firm’s probability of being penalized. For low-risk firms, the expected 
 
122.  This can be interpreted to include payments made under a deferred or non-prosecution 
agreement and any fines payable following conviction. 
123.  Similar results obtain if high-risk firms must pay a higher penalty than low-risk firms. 
124.  Note that the probability of enforcement is assumed not to change. If the firm 
implements an effective compliance program, that will both reduce the likelihood of misconduct and 
increase the probability of detection conditional on misconduct, having an overall neutral effect on the 
risk of enforcement. See supra note 57. 
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benefit is $500,000, and for high-risk firms, it is $2.5 million.125 Both types of 
firm would maximize their expected value by implementing effective 
compliance programs.126 
Assume now that firms publish financial statements at the end of each 
period. A firm that incurs expenditure on compliance in the first period will 
need to reflect the impact of this in its financial statements.127 This 
encompasses, as we have seen, not simply direct costs of compliance personnel, 
but indirect impact on revenues through changes in business practices. Simply 
declaring an increase in costs and a reduction in revenues without further 
explanation will cause investors to infer that the firm’s business model is 
troubled and result in an adverse market reaction. Low-risk firms will therefore 
wish to justify the costs incurred as resulting from implementation of a 
compliance program. However, if high-risk firms make an equivalent 
disclosure, they reveal to investors not only that they have implemented an 
effective compliance program, but that their firm has a high underlying risk of 
misconduct. Even with an effective compliance program in place, high-risk 
firms still face a mean residual expected penalty of $2.5 million, as opposed to 
$500,000 for low-risk firms. 
As we have seen, a high-risk firm cannot readily incur the costs of 
compliance without explaining them. What if it simply mimics the compliance 
effort of a low-risk firm, incurring costs of only $200,000? This would not be 
enough for the high-risk firm to implement a sufficiently strong compliance 
program to be deemed “effective”—rather, this system would be more of a 
“box-checking” affair that would be insufficient to attract a discount from any 
penalty payable at t = 2. From the shareholders’ point of view, implementing 
such a program would be a waste of resources, actually reducing the high-risk 
firm’s value by the cost of the program—that is, $200,000. However, it would 
mean that at t = 1, investors would be unable to distinguish high-risk from low-
risk firms, keeping the high-risk firm’s stock price artificially high. 
If investors anticipate this series of events, they will factor in the expected 
effects on firm value of misconduct, compliance, and enforcement as a blended 
average. For high-risk firms, which comprise 10% of the population, the 
expected impact is $200,000 spent on an ineffective compliance program 
combined with an expected penalty that remains at $5 million, without 
discount, resulting in a total expected cost to investors of $5.2 million. For low-
risk firms, comprising the remaining 90% of the population, the expected 
impact is $200,000 spent on an effective compliance program and an expected 
 
125.  This is calculated as follows: for low-risk firms, the benefit is 0.5 x (0.1 x $10,000,000) 
= $500,000; for high-risk firms, the benefit is 0.5 x (0.5 x $10,000,000) = $2,500,000. 
126.  For low-risk firms, an effective compliance program has a net present value of $300,000 
($500,000 benefit minus $200,000 cost); for high-risk firms, such a program has a net present value of 
$1,900,000 ($2,500,000 benefit minus $600,000 cost). 
127.  Not to do so would amount to securities fraud. 
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penalty that is now reduced to only $500,000,128 resulting in a total expected 
cost to investors of $700,000. These amounts together yield a weighted average 
expected compliance and penalty cost of $1.15 million,129 which investors, 
unable to distinguish between firm types, will rationally factor into the 
valuation of every firm. 
A high-risk firm that disclosed compliance costs of $600,000 at t = 1 
would reveal its type to investors. Investors would infer that its expected 
penalty is $2.5 million. The high-risk firm’s market capitalization would fall by 
$1.95 million, reflecting the extent to which its revealed penalty and 
compliance costs of $3.1 million exceed the blended average penalty and 
compliance costs of $1.15 million that investors would otherwise attribute to 
the firm. If the managers of the high-risk firms are paid in stock that vests at t = 
1, they will improve their personal returns by causing the firm to invest only 
$200,000 in its compliance program, so investors are unable to draw this 
inference. This behavior will harm the value of a high-risk firm at t = 2 by 
increasing the expected penalty it must pay (as well as wasting the costs of the 
ineffective compliance program), but, by this time, the managers will have sold 
their stock and retired. 
Low-risk firms of course would like to signal their type to investors, as 
doing so would result in a corresponding increase in their valuation. The 
problem is that the myopic behavior of managers in the high-risk firms “jams” 
the low-risk firms’ signal of low compliance expenditure. Low-risk firms are 
no longer able to differentiate themselves if high-risk firms emulate their 
behavior. 
This simplified example features only two types of firms, designated 
according to whether they were at high or low risk of encountering misconduct 
and subsequent enforcement. Where, more realistically, firm risk levels can be 
partitioned more finely, then the result may be expected to converge on all 
firms emulating the behavior of the lowest-risk type.130 Where in expectation it 
would be value-maximizing for such firms not to engage in compliance efforts, 
then we may expect the entire population to underperform on compliance. 
The predictions change, however, if a firm is the subject of enforcement 
activity. Investors are likely to treat this as a signal that it is a higher-risk type 
than was previously known. We may therefore expect such firms to publicize 
extensive investments in compliance, which investors will anticipate are now 
justified. By similar logic, if many firms in the same industry have been 
 
128.  The low-risk firm’s original expected penalty was 0.1 x $10,000,000 = $1,000,000. This 
is reduced by the compliance program to 0.5 x (0.1 x $10,000,000) = $500,000. 
129.  This is calculated as follows: (0.1 x $5,200,000) + (0.9 x $700,000) = $1,150,000. 
130.  See, e.g., BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS: A PRIMER 87 fn 2 (2d 
ed. 2005) (discussing classic adverse selection models: “[in] a model with continuous types . . . only the 
worst type . . . may be [offered], so the market essentially unravels.”). 
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subjects of enforcement proceedings, then investors may raise their evaluation 
of the baseline risk for the entire industry. 
This analysis predicts that firms paying managers with stock-based 
compensation will generally invest little in compliance activity. An exception 
would be firms that are already known by investors to be at high risk of 
enforcement: firms that have been the subject of enforcement actions or are in 
industries where enforcement actions are frequent. As their high underlying 
risk of enforcement is already known to the market, such firms do not fear 
revealing this as a by-product of high investment in compliance. At the same 
time, they stand to gain if compliance investment reduces their expected 
enforcement exposure. This hypothesis is consistent with our parallel empirical 
work on the adoption of board-level compliance committees, which are most 
commonly found in industries that have been the target of vigorous 
enforcement action, such as banks, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare, and are 
generally more likely to be implemented by firms that are the subject of a prior 
Department of Justice enforcement action.131 
This Part has shown how stock-based pay is likely to give managers 
incentives to focus on the short term with regard to investments in compliance. 
It seems plausible that investors cannot easily assess misconduct and 
enforcement risk for many firms. Under these circumstances, managers focused 
on short-run stock price performance have incentives to short-change 
compliance. This is likely to harm both the firm’s shareholders and society 
more generally in the long run. 
IV. Board Oversight of Compliance 
A. The Board’s Role in Compliance Oversight 
We saw in Section II.B that the board is expected to play a role in 
overseeing the functioning of an effective compliance program.132 The 
Department of Justice’s guidance regarding effective compliance provides that 
responsibility for internal oversight and monitoring of compliance programs 
should lie with the board of directors, usually through a committee of 
independent directors—either the audit committee or, where established, a 
separate compliance committee.133 Boards are expected to understand the goals 
and operation of their firm’s compliance function—knowledge which should be 
supported by regular reporting and a clear flow of information.134 A direct 
 
131.  See Armour et al., supra note 94. 
132.  See supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
133.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 75, at 2. 
134.  The United States Sentencing Guidelines have, since 2010, required that effective 
compliance programs entail direct communication between the board and the person tasked with 
 
  
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:1 2020 
32 
channel of reporting from compliance to the board is a means of fostering not 
only autonomy within the compliance program but also open upward 
transmission of information. 
The board’s responsibility for compliance oversight has longstanding 
roots in the corporate enabling statutes as well as the widespread acceptance of 
the “monitoring board” model. Delaware corporate law permits a corporation 
“to conduct . . . any lawful business or purposes”135 and the statement of 
omnibus corporate purpose in the charter is framed in terms of “any lawful act 
or activity.”136 The board’s responsibility for assuring that the corporation stays 
within these “lawfulness” boundaries flows directly from the statutory mandate 
that “the business and affairs” of a corporation “shall be managed by or under 
the direction of a board of directors.”137 
The board’s compliance oversight role also reflects a more general 
characterization of boards of U.S. public companies as performing a 
“monitoring” function. The board’s role in this widely-held view is to monitor 
the executives—through recruitment; oversight of strategic choices; control of 
conflicts of interest, particularly as regards compensation; and compliance. 
Within this model, almost all the members of the board, barring the CEO, are 
“independent” directors—that is, not tied by any employment relationship to 
the firm or its management. 
This “monitoring board” has been well established as the corporate 
governance model for nearly forty years.138 The board has not always been 
conceived of in this way. Historically, a board’s role was largely to provide 
advice to the CEO and, incidentally, to be available to approve corporate 
actions of direct conflict, such as the CEO’s compensation contact. The board 
was repurposed as a monitoring organ during the 1970s and 1980s, eventually 
consisting almost exclusively of independent directors with a monitoring 
charge. This transformation was promoted by academic theorizing in the wake 
of corporate debacles like the failure of Penn Central and the so-called 
“questionable payments” scandal of the mid-1970s.139 A critical factor was the 
willingness of the Delaware courts to credit deliberation by an independent 
board in responding to a hostile takeover bid.140 When confronted with a 
proposal that is likely to result in loss of their jobs and the associated 
emoluments, managers face an obvious conflict; thus, board review, 
 
executive responsibility for the compliance program. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
8C2.5(f)(3)(C) (2016). 
135.  DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 101 (b). 
136.  Id. § 102(a)(3). 
137.  Id. § 141(a). 
138.  This history is traced in Gordon, supra note 13, at 1514-35. 
139.  MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 
(1976); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971). 
140.  Gordon, supra note 13, at 1523-26. 
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deliberation, and oversight of defensive measures adds the critical element of 
legitimacy.141 
Compliance monitoring fits into this paradigm. The board has an 
especially important monitoring role where managerial self-interest may be in 
conflict with shareholder interests. As Part III demonstrated, the high-powered 
incentives put in place to align managerial and shareholder interests in the 
overall performance of the firm give managers particular incentives to 
underinvest in compliance measures. Managers’ short-term payoff 
opportunities conflict with long-term shareholder interests. Shareholders face 
losses from: fines and damages assessed for non-compliance; business 
opportunities foregone because of disruptive liquidity shocks associated with 
significant payouts; and stock price declines as investors come to re-assess the 
earnings and growth rate of the firm when it complies with applicable law. 
Managers, unlike shareholders as a group, can exit before the realization of 
compliance failure losses and very rarely face personal prosecution for 
corporate misconduct.142 Under current arrangements, managers frequently cash 
out of stock-based positions, even before leaving the firm, in the interest of 
“diversification.”143 Even an (unrealistic) requirement of an indefinite holding 
period would not fully resolve the short-termist conflict since managers’ tenure 
and compensation are frequently tied to stock-based measures of performance. 
The critical feature is this: high-powered stock-based incentives for 
managers require the board to step up to provide high-powered monitoring. 
Indeed, the added compliance risks associated with high-powered managerial 
incentives was one of the fundamental lessons of the financial disclosure 
scandals that produced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.144 The Act created a bespoke 
compliance regime that includes outside vetting of internal financial controls145 
and direct tasking of the audit committee of the board with special compliance 
oversight responsibilities.146 But financial controls are just the tip of the 
 
141.  Id. 
142.  See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 
1801-19 (2015) (presenting data showing that in two-thirds of deferred and nonprosecution agreements 
with corporations over the period from 2001 to 2012, no individual officers or employees were 
prosecuted; where individual prosecutions occurred, they were usually of subordinate employees rather 
than officers; and where individuals were convicted, their sentences were lighter than the average for the 
crimes in question). 
143.  See generally Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 95, at 176-79. 
144.  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New 
Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2003). See also supra note 33. 
145.  Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C § 7262 (2018), requires the 
issuer’s auditor to certify the adequacy of the issuer’s “internal control structure and procedures… for 
financial reporting.” 
146.  Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 makes the audit committee “directly 
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work” of the firm’s auditor. 15 
U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(2) (2018). Section 202 of the Act provides that “[a]ll auditing services . . . provided to 
an issuer by the auditor of the issuer shall be preapproved by the audit committee of the issuer.” Id. § 
78j-1(i)(1)(A). Section 201 of the Act prohibits the provision of certain nonaudit services by the firm’s 
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iceberg. Over the period from the 1970s through the 1990s, Congress passed a 
host of statutes regulating environmental practices,147 workplace health and 
safety,148 and various other elements of corporate behavior.149 These new 
regulatory obligations followed measures that had previously been adopted in 
the food and drug area, for example,150 and other domains in which unchecked 
corporate behavior could impose externalities. Unlike financial disclosure, 
which can be addressed by a generally specified compliance regime, these 
many different statutes, applying to different firms in different ways, require 
compliance oversight efforts tailored to the individual firm in light of its 
business model and other relevant features. 
B. The Monitoring Board and “Skin in the Game” 
Prior to the mid-1990s, the working assumption in corporate governance 
circles had been that, even with high-powered managerial incentives that might 
incline managers to short-termism, board compliance oversight could work 
effectively because the board’s low-powered incentives would supply the 
complementary long-term perspective. Board directors predominantly received 
compensation in fixed stipends, served long terms that would extend beyond 
the tenure of any particular CEO, and had reputations that would be stained by 
corporate law violations. This assumption has been undercut by the changing 
patterns of director compensation since the mid-1990s, a shift to stock-based 
compensation which both increases the “power” of directors’ economic 
 
auditor, id. § 78j-1(g), and requires preapproval of the audit committee for nonprohibited services, id. § 
78j-1(h). See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(b) (2019) (codifying Exchange Act Rule 10A-3(b)); Standards 
Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8220, Exchange Act 
Release No. 37-47654, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26001, 79 SEC Docket 2876 (Apr. 9, 
2003); Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33-8183, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47265, Public Utility Holding Company Act 
Release No. 35-27642, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-25,915, Investment Advisers Act 
Release No. IA-2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003). 
147.  E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387); Environmental Pesticide Control Act 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq.); Safe Drinking 
Water Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 160 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq.); 
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1387); Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 
1251-1387); Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, amended in 1977 and 1990 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et. seq.); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. 
No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.); Mine Safety and Health Act 
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 91 Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.) 
148.  E.g., Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970; Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. 
149.  E.g., Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, §§ 201–42, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118–24 
(1970) (codified as amended at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.); Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977. 
150.  E.g., Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) 
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incentives but also clearly sets increasing the stock price as the target by which 
director service will be judged. 
Traditionally, directors were paid a fixed salary.151 However, an 
influential 1995 critique from the National Association of Corporate Directors 
asked how the payment of a fixed retainer for simply showing up to board 
meetings created incentives for engagement.152 The problem was two-fold. Low 
pay creates little incentive for effort. But high fixed pay can compromise the 
independence of directors with respect to executives, given that there are ways 
in which executives can influence the length of directors’ tenure. As the matter 
was put by Albert “Chainsaw Al” Dunlap, a member of the NACD panel (and 
CEO of Scott Paper Company): 
 
What kind of contribution will the directors ever make if they don’t have a 
vested interest in the company’s financial success? They’ve got to show they 
believe in the company, that they’re willing to stand behind their choices. . . . 
Any director who isn’t willing to be paid 100 per cent in stock doesn’t believe in 
the company.153 
 
Since the mid-1990s, partly in response to these critiques, directors’ 
compensation has changed quite significantly.154 To heighten the incentives for 
performance monitoring by the newly arriving independent directors, director 
compensation has followed the structure of CEO pay by moving to stock-based 
pay. According to survey data from compensation consultants FW Cook and 
Pearl Meyer, board members of large public companies who have no executive 
role can today expect to receive a total compensation of approximately 
$250,000, of which around 60 per cent will be stock-based.155 The stock-based 
 
151.  Elson, supra note 19, at 147-48 (finding that the median annual retainer for outside 
directors was $2,000 in 1962, rising to $6,000 by 1975, $15,000 by 1981, and $18,900 by 1985). 
152.  NACD BLUE RIBBON REPORT, supra note 20. This critique both distilled and advanced 
the contemporary theorizing about the need to incentivize directors. See Charles M. Elson, Director 
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom and a Cure, supra 
note 19, at 162-64 . Indeed, director compensation was not legally recognized in the United States until 
the late 1940s, although informal modes flourished, such as meeting fees, passing of stock tips, and even 
salaries. Id. at 138, 142. As of 1979, the median NYSE firm paid an annual director retainer fee of less 
than $10,000. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 96TH CONG. 
605 tbl. 9 (Comm. Print 1980) (surveying 1200 major firms drawn from NYSE, Amex, Nasdaq, and 
OTC/regional exchanges from 1978-1979). 
153.  ALBERT J. DUNLAP, MEAN BUSINESS 218 (1996). 
154.  See Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
155.  2016 FW COOK REPORT, supra note 22, at 5-6; NACD/PEARL MEYER REPORT, supra 
note 22, at 7-8. There is some industry variation, with technology sector firms making slightly higher 
use of stock-based compensation (70%, on average) and financial services making the least use (47%). 
Independent directors who sit on specific committees are often—but by no means universally—offered 
some sort of uplift to compensate them for the extra work involved. As of 2016, 41% of large cap 
companies offered a retainer for audit committee membership, and a further 21% offered meeting fees, 
with 38% having no uplift. Id. at 13. However, the absolute sums involved in these uplifts are modest. 
Independent directors sitting on the audit committees of large cap firms that pay retainers for committee 
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component is primarily comprised of RSUs, with a component in some cases of 
stock options.156 
Directors’ wealth is affected also in other ways by changes in their firm’s 
stock price. In an important study tracking the fortunes of Fortune 500 directors 
elected in 1994 to 1996 over a subsequent 5-year period, David Yermack 
considered the combined effect of incentives from: compensation received, 
changes in equity ownership, changes in disclosed conflicts of interest, and 
board seats obtained and departed from—all in relation to changes in the stock 
price of their firms. He found that a director’s personal wealth increased 
(declined) by 11 cents for every $1,000 increase (decrease) in the market value 
of the firm, and that more than half of this effect was attributable to changes in 
the value of stock compensation.157 
Of course, this is far lower than the intensity of incentives achieved for 
CEOs.158 The study naturally raises the question of whether directors’ stock 
compensation actually creates economically meaningful incentives.159 Yermack 
points out that, although smaller than those of executives, directors’ stock-
based compensation incentives are “nontrivial.” In his sample, a one standard-
deviation change in a firm’s stock market performance results in a change in a 
director’s expected wealth by about $285,000.160 The intensity of these 
incentives seems likely to have increased in the interim, as the aggregate 
amount of director rewards has continued to grow.161 
Independent directors are typically very wealthy. Many will have served 
as senior executives in large companies or enjoyed successful professional 
careers in law or accounting.162 Against a net worth measured in tens or 
hundreds of millions, even changes of a quarter of a million dollars may not be 
particularly significant. Yet to focus solely on the direct financial effects is to 
overlook the symbolic impact of performance-related pay on intrinsic 
motivation. “Intrinsic” motivation encompasses the desire of conscientious 
 
membership receive a median uplift of $10,000. This rises to $25,000, or approximately one-tenth of 
their “base” director compensation, for chairing the audit committee. Id. at 13-14. 
156.  2016 FW COOK REPORT, supra note 22, at 6. Options are very much a minority pursuit, 
accounting for only 3% of mean director compensation at large public companies. Id. The use of options 
also varies across industries, from 8% of total director compensation in the technology sector to only 1% 
in the financial sector. Id. 
157.  David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention and Reputation Incentives for Outside 
Directors, 59 J. FIN. 2281, 2306 (2004). 
158.  For example, Fahlenbrach and Stulz document that CEOs of banks during the financial 
crisis earned $24 for every $1,000 increase in firm valuation. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, 
Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis 99 J. FIN. ECON. 11, 17 (2011). 
159.  BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 95, at 34. 
160.  Yermack, supra note 157, at 2282. 
161.  Yermack’s study period coincided with an extraordinary surge in the value of public 
company stocks at the end of the twentieth century, during which the ratio of executive compensation to 
firm value fell to an all-time low. 
162.  See, e.g., SPENCER STUART, U.S. BOARD INDEX 2017, 11 (2017) (listing the professional 
backgrounds of directors of S&P 500 companies). 
  
Taking Compliance Seriously 
37 
individuals to “do a good job,” or of competitive individuals to succeed.163 As 
well as extrinsically motivating action through immediate financial returns, 
performance pay also gives directors a highly salient benchmark for evaluating 
the “success” of their tenure. Directors are typically highly focused, goal-
oriented individuals who are used to having their performance evaluated by a 
variety of metrics and are highly competitive in their pursuit of success by 
whatever metric is applied. In this context, payment in stock reinforces a shared 
assumption that the metric by which performance is to be measured is the stock 
price—an aspect of “corporate culture.”164 In other words, stock-based pay may 
motivate behavior even with modest amounts of financial variation by 
functioning as a highly salient metric for performance. This conjecture is borne 
out by studies showing that stock-based pay for directors is associated with a 
positive impact on firm value,165 and meaningful differences in corporate 
behavior—including greater corporate risk-taking166 and richer voluntary 
disclosures.167 
C. Perverse Effects of Directors’ Focus on Stock Price 
The shift to stock-based compensation increases the alignment of 
directors’ rewards with the stock price, at least until they come to sell their 
stock, which will usually be at the end of their tenure plus a dignified waiting 
period.168 As we have seen, this gives directors greater incentive to engage with 
the firm in controlling managerial conflicts and pushing the latter to increase 
the value of the stock price. However, these same incentives for directors have 
a tendency to replicate the problems of short-changed compliance that we 
analyzed in Part III. If directors are simply “weathervanes for the stock 
 
163.  See, e.g., SUCCESSFUL MANAGEMENT BY MOTIVATION: BALANCING INTRINSIC AND 
EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES (Bruno Frey & Margit Osterloh eds., 2001); FREY, supra note 84. 
164.  See David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990); David M. Kreps, 
Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives 87 AM. ECON. REV. PAP. & PROC. 359 (1997); Anjan 
Thakor, Corporate Culture in Banking, F.R.B.N.Y. ECON. POL. REV., Aug. 2016, at 5; John R. Graham, 
Campbell R. Harvey, Jillian Popadak, & Shivaram Rajgopal, Corporate Culture: Evidence from the 
Field (NBER Working Paper No. 23255, 2017). 
165.  See Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
166.  See Yuval Deutsch, Thomas Keil & Tomi Laamanen, A Dual Agency View of Board 
Compensation: The Joint Effects of Outside Director and CEO Stock Options on Firm Risk, 32 STRAT. 
MGMT. J. 212 (2010). See also sources cited infra notes 168-173. 
167.  Partha Sengupta & Suning Zhang, Equity-Based Compensation of Outside Directors and 
Corporate Disclosure Quality, 32 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1073 (2015). 
168.  See Elson, supra note 19, at 170-71. A recent survey describes the formal equity 
retention requirements, including a mechanism for retained equity ownership post-retirement through 
“deferred stock units.” FW COOK, 2019 DIRECTOR COMPENSATION REPORT (2019), 18. Retention 
requirements are more stringent at large cap companies. Id. See also SHEARMAN & STERLING, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2017, at 76 (surveying 100 largest U.S. 
companies). 
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market,”169 then, unless their time horizons are substantially longer than those 
of the managers, they are unlikely to function effectively in reducing 
managerial agency costs in the form of the time-horizon problem.170 
Assessing direct effects on directors’ engagement with compliance is 
difficult because firms report so little about their compliance activity.171 
However, some studies report corrosion of contiguous monitoring 
responsibilities associated with stock-based director pay. For example, granting 
options to directors was associated in the early 2000s with weaker oversight of 
option backdating by executives.172 Moreover, stock-based pay for audit 
committee members is associated with a greater frequency of accounting 
restatements.173 
D. Interacting Managers’ and Directors’ Incentives 
The concern about the impact of stock-based compensation for directors 
on compliance oversight particularly arises because of the interaction effect 
with managerial compensation. The undoubted fact is this: managers’ 
incentives have massively ratcheted up in power since the 1980s in light of the 
performance focus on shareholder value. As we have shown, this creates the 
risk of management’s short-termist willingness to underinvest in compliance, 
both in devising a business model and in creating the formal compliance 
apparatus. High-powered incentives to promote shareholder value call for high-
powered compliance both to protect long-term shareholder interests as well as 
to protect society. Thus, the board’s compliance oversight duties need to be 
guided both by its statutory duty to assure that the corporation’s activities are 
lawful and by its fiduciary duty of loyalty to shareholder interests. The board 
determines both the amount and form of executive compensation.174 Its 
statutory and fiduciary duties include the obligation of compliance oversight 
that complements the compensation scheme it has put in place.175 In other 
words, the board (and fiduciary law) needs to guard against the possibility that 
director compensation is blunting compliance oversight just when the pattern of 
 
169.  E-mail from Leo Strine to Jeffrey N. Gordon (July 31, 2018, 06:08 EST) (on file with 
authors) (referring to public remarks by Delaware Chief Justice). 
170.  The upside bias problem is likely to be less of an issue for directors, for whom option 
compensation is rare. See sources cited supra note 155. 
171.  It is consistent, however, with the fact that very few companies go as far as establishing 
a board-level compliance committee. See Armour et al., supra note 94. 
172.  Donal Byard & Ling Yi, The Impact of Directors’ Option Compensation on their 
Independence 4 (Working Paper 2005). 
173.  Deborah S. Archambeault, F. Todd Dezoort, & Dana R. Hermanson, Audit Committee 
Incentive Compensation and Accounting Restatements, 25 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 956 (2008). 
174.  See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. 
Shareholder Litig., No. 5215-VCG, 2011 WL 4826104 (Del. Ch. 2011); In re Walt Disney Derivative 
Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
175.  See supra Section IV.A and infra Section V.A. 
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managerial compensation suggests that the board’s compliance engagement is 
more vital, from a shareholder and social point of view. 
V. Caremark and Its Limitations 
A. Caremark Duties 
The Caremark standard can be understood as a careful attempt by 
Delaware courts to balance two competing goals: on the one hand, the desire to 
encourage boards to engage with their executives about their firms’ compliance 
activities, and on the other, the desire not to induce boards to expend corporate 
resources excessively on compliance programs as a means of insuring board 
members against liability risk.176 
Conceptually, we may distinguish two stages at which directors’ 
compliance oversight is engaged. The “ex post stage” concerns responses to 
information received by the board that suggests something may be amiss—so-
called “red flags.”177 When it comes to a director’s attention that there is, or 
may be, misconduct taking place, it will trigger a fiduciary duty to investigate 
and take appropriate consequent steps.178 The degree of investigation and 
subsequent action demanded is a function of the extent of the evidence of 
misconduct available to the directors and the seriousness of the consequences 
of potential misconduct. Note, though, that the extent of this ex post duty 
depends crucially on the quality of the information coming to the board. To 
what extent does the board have a positive duty to ensure an upward flow of 
information regarding compliance? This is what may be termed the “ex ante 
stage” of compliance oversight: review of the firm’s implementation of a 
compliance program and general monitoring of that program’s performance. 
Until the mid-1990s, it was thought that directors of Delaware companies 
were under no positive duty to monitor employees’ conduct. In the well-known 
 
176.  See generally sources cited supra note 31; see also Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. 
Gyves, In re Caremark: Good Intentions, Unintended Consequences, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 691, 
701-2 (2004) (noting that the potential for liability encourages boards to waste resources on ineffective 
compliance programs). Caremark could also be framed as drawing a distinction between a conduct 
standard (i.e., that boards should engage with management to assure adequate compliance oversight) and 
a standard of review (particularly, because of hindsight bias, courts should be reluctant to impose 
liability). See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253 (1999); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate 
Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
177.  We might alternatively style these two modes of oversight as “chronic”—continuing—
and “acute”—in response to particular events. 
178.  In re Wells Fargo & Co. S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp.3d 1074 (N.D. Cal. 
2017); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963); Okla. Firefighters Pension & 
Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, No. 12151-VCG, 2017 WL 6452240 (Del. Ch. 2017); Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ 
Pension Tr. Fund v. Jacobs, No. 10872-VCMR, 2016 WL 4076369 (Del. Ch. 2016); In re Massey 
Energy Co. Derivative and Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
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1963 case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers,179 the Delaware Supreme Court held 
that boards were “entitled to rely on the honesty and integrity of their 
subordinates until something occurs to put them on suspicion that something is 
wrong.”180 More colorfully, the Court went on to explain that “absent cause for 
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate 
system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to 
suspect exists.”181 In other words, directors meeting in the smoky boardrooms 
of the 1960s had license to adopt a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to 
misconduct by subordinates. Provided that directors could plausibly deny 
suspicion of any relevant misconduct, they would not face liability. We can see 
that, far from encouraging boards to implement effective corporate compliance 
programs, Allis-Chalmers gave them an incentive not to do so. 
Seen from today’s perspective, this approach appears obviously 
problematic. However, the Allis-Chalmers position reflects all of: limited 
expectations for director vigilance in the advisory board model; a sparser 
regulatory environment in which compliance concerns were more distant; a 
belief that public-company managers, being of especially good character, were 
not likely to violate the law; and perhaps even a view about firm value 
maximization at the time. Before authorities began granting any penalty 
discounts or prosecution leniency for the existence of a compliance program, it 
was far from obvious that implementing a compliance program was in 
shareholders’ (as opposed to society’s) interests. A compliance program might 
deter misconduct by employees, but it would also increase the likelihood that 
any misconduct occurring would come to light.182 It seems quite plausible that 
shareholders would have wanted boards to adopt a correspondingly casual 
approach to overseeing compliance. 
Directors’ ex ante oversight obligations changed significantly in 1996, 
with In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation.183 Although the 
opinion was strictly concerned only with approval of a settlement between the 
parties, Chancellor Allen took the opportunity to announce to boards that their 
obligations had moved on since the 1960s: 
 
[I]t would, in my opinion, be a mistake to conclude that . . . corporate boards 
may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the 
corporation, without assuring themselves that information and reporting systems 
exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to senior 
management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to 
allow management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed 
 
179.  Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125. 
180.  Id. at 130. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Arlen, supra note 57. 
183.  698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its 
business performance.184 
 
In other words, boards now had an ex ante obligation, not conditional on 
red flags or notice of any irregularities, to ensure that their company had in 
place a monitoring system to generate timely information regarding the 
employees’ compliance. This new obligation to implement a compliance 
program complemented the initiatives taken in sentencing around the same 
time.185 The Sentencing Guidelines now gave stronger incentives to companies 
to implement effective compliance programs, and Caremark provided 
encouragement to boards to do the same in the interest of maximizing firm 
value. The implication of an ex ante duty interacts with the ex post elements of 
monitoring. Requiring firms to implement compliance programs means that 
boards will inevitably be more frequently exposed to “red flags,” and 
consequently find their ex post obligations triggered.186 
B. The “Good Faith” Standard 
A core concern with director liability is that it will instill an overly 
cautious approach to decision-making. The idea is best-known in relation to 
business decisions, where it underpins the “business judgment rule.”187 If 
directors anticipate potential liability for “bad” decisions, they will be less 
willing to pursue courses of action that might involve downside risk for the 
firm.188 This attitude is problematic, from diversified shareholders’ perspective, 
if directors pass up opportunities with higher expected values because they are 
concerned about downside outcomes. Any liability risk faced by directors is 
undiversified, meaning they will behave in a risk-averse fashion. The business 
judgment rule consequently grants directors a presumption that they acted 
consistently with their duties where they make a well-informed business 
decision in good faith. 
Chancellor Allen’s opinion in Caremark singled out cases where boards 
failed to take any action as regards compliance.189 Total failure to act does not 
amount to a business decision and so would not attract the protection of the 
business judgment rule. However, the more interesting question concerns the 
extent of the board’s obligations. In Caremark itself, Chancellor Allen 
 
184.  Id. at 970. 
185.  Id. at 969. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59. 
186.  Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 89. 
187.  See, e.g., S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
93, 97-111 (1979) (reviewing the historical origins of the rule). 
188.  See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l. Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 110-17 (2004) 
(reviewing the risk-taking argument). 
189.  698 A.2d 959, 968. 
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characterized the extent to which the board requires the company to implement 
compliance systems as a question of business judgment: 
 
Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system 
is a question of business judgment. And obviously too, no rationally designed 
information and reporting system will remove the possibility that the corporation 
will violate laws or regulations, or that senior officers or directors may 
nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts 
material to the corporation’s compliance with the law.190 
 
Although Chancellor Allen couched these monitoring obligations in terms 
of directors’ duty of care, he made clear that the key question was whether the 
board had made “a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and 
reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that 
appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a 
matter of ordinary operations” (emphasis added).191 This distinction reflected 
the fact that in 1986, the Delaware legislature had modified the DGCL to 
permit companies to exculpate directors from monetary liability for breaches of 
duty not involving bad faith or disloyalty.192 Subsequent caselaw has 
accordingly characterized directors’ monitoring duties as part of their 
overarching duty of loyalty.193 
The practical question for boards is the extent to which they are required 
by their duties to act in relation to monitoring. The answer, at least as regards 
ex ante oversight, is that their actual obligation is minimal. In Chancellor 
Allen’s view, the Caremark duty would only be violated by “a sustained or 
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists.”194 Or, 
as it was subsequently put by the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter: 
 
(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system 
or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously 
failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.195 
 
It is not excessively reductionist to characterize this continuing 
monitoring obligation as binary: either there is some effort, or there is no effort. 
 
190.  Id. at 970. 
191.  Id. (emphasis added). 
192.  DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7). See generally James B. Behrens, Delaware Section 
102(b)(7): A Statutory Response to the Director and Officer Liability Insurance Crisis 65 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 481 (1987). 
193.  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 362 (Del. 2006). 
194.  Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
195.  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 370. 
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Any level of positive effort will suffice for directors to meet their fiduciary 
obligations in this context. This low threshold is reflected in statements 
regarding the sorts of board-level failures that would be necessary to ground a 
claim for liability196: 
 
[C]ontentions that the company lacked an audit committee, that the company 
had an audit committee that met only sporadically and devoted patently 
inadequate time to its work, or that the audit committee had clear notice of 
serious accounting irregularities and simply chose to ignore them or, even 
worse, to encourage their continuation. 
 
The recent case of Horman v. Abbey,197 concerning allegations of 
Caremark violations by the board of United Parcel Service in relation to the 
transportation of illegal tobacco products, provides an illustrative example. The 
fact that the plaintiffs conceded that the board had established an audit 
committee whose responsibilities included “oversight of ‘the Company’s 
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements’” and that the board was 
“provided updates about legal compliance through reports from the UPS Legal 
Department” was fatal to their claim that the board had failed to implement any 
reporting or compliance systems.198 By simply establishing these structures, the 
board had met the ex ante part of their Caremark obligations. 
C. The Caremark Standard’s Balance 
Chancellor Allen, as we have seen, viewed the extent to which a board 
implements a compliance program as “obviously” a matter of business 
judgment.199 It is worth exploring the underlying rationale for this perspective. 
Facially, decisions about the structure of a corporate compliance program seem 
far-removed from decisions about which lines of product to push or where to 
open a factory. Yet there are indeed commonalities. The design of an effective 
compliance program entails judgments about firm-level risks and the 
interaction of corporate strategy—and especially compensation policy—and 
compliance risk.200 These judgments depend on firm-specific information and 
expertise with which directors are likely to be better endowed than courts. This 
 
196.  Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003). See also David B. Shaev Profit 
Sharing Acct. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 1449-N, 2006 WL 391931 at *5 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
197.  No. 12290-VCS, 2017 WL 242571 (Del. Ch. 2017).  
198.  Id. at 8. 
199.  See supra text accompanying note 184. 
200.  See supra Section II.B. 
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logic mirrors the well-known “institutional competence” rationale for the 
business judgment rule.201 
More problematic, perhaps, is the issue of risk-taking. Business judgment 
review is intended to encourage decision-makers not to be risk-averse in their 
selection of projects that maximize expected value for shareholders.202 Is this 
desirable where what is at stake is compliance with laws imposed on 
corporations to secure wider benefits for society? An argument in favor 
emerges from the uncertainty over what exactly works in compliance.203 It is 
socially optimal for firms to minimize the joint costs of compliance and law-
breaking.204 Given that there is lack of clarity over which compliance 
mechanisms are most effective, the selection of appropriate mechanisms entails 
elements of risk. If directors fear liability, they may tend to be risk-averse in 
their design of compliance programs, causing their firms to waste money on 
measures that do not deliver meaningful reductions in misconduct rates. This 
behavior may harm not only shareholders, by incurring inefficiently high 
compliance costs, but also society, through poorly specified compliance 
programs and the opportunity cost of lack of experimentation with new 
compliance technology. 
Moreover, on the theory that well-advised boards of public companies are 
populated by people who try to “do the right thing,” articulating a modest legal 
obligation coupled with lengthy dicta about what best practice might entail 
permits the court to give a prod where appropriate, without forcing conduct 
where inappropriate.205 Delaware cases often can be seen as “parables” of good 
versus questionable behavior by officers and directors even where liability is 
not imposed.206 The goal appears to be to establish exemplary “standards of 
conduct” even while being chary with liability-imposing “standards of 
review.”207 
 
201.  See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 188, at 117-124 (noting that judges are not business 
experts); Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. L. 1437, 
1439, 1442-43 (1985). 
202.  Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); 
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l. Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052-53 (Del. Ch. 1996). A “risk neutral” business 
decision is one in which negative as well as positive prospective outcomes are equally weighted in 
determining whether to take the risk. A “risk averse” party would give additional weight to prospective 
negative outcomes. 
203.  See supra Section II.B. 
204.  Miller, supra note 68. 
205.  This interpretation of Caremark is based on the casebook co-authored by (former) 
Chancellor Allen. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 244 (5th ed. 2015). 
206.  See Rock, supra note 36, at 1016 (1997). 
207.  See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1295 (2001) 
(endorsing the distinction of Professor Mel Eisenberg); supra note 176 (explaining and citing 
Eisenberg’s arguments). 
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The framework established by Caremark imposes what is essentially a 
binary obligation on boards with respect to the establishment of a compliance 
program. So long as something has been set up, then the way in which it is 
designed and implemented is a matter for the board’s business judgment. The 
rationale for framing the obligation in this way had two components: (i) a 
desire to avoid inducing overinvestment in compliance programs by directors 
concerned about liability; and (ii) optimism regarding the provision of non-
binding judicial guidance to parties. 
D. The Growing Imbalance 
Chancellor Allen’s approach in Caremark thus struck a balance between 
encouraging boards to think seriously about organizational compliance in light 
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, without invoking concerns about forcing 
boards to implement inappropriate and costly compliance programs or putting 
courts in the difficult business of evaluating compliance regimes. This balance 
was struck before observers appreciated the impact of stock-based 
compensation (for both managers and directors) on a company’s incentives to 
invest in appropriate compliance measures. High-powered incentives invited 
short-termist compliance strategies by managers, through a business model that 
would take significant compliance failure risks and/or through lax internal 
compliance monitoring. The move to give directors “skin in the game” through 
stock-based pay for directors aligned directors’ financial incentives on this 
point with those of executives. Directors now have incentives to tolerate a 
suboptimal compliance regime, both ex ante in designing the regime and ex 
post in following up on warning signs. The Caremark framing of directors’ 
oversight duties does nothing to ameliorate the incentives that stock-based 
compensation for directors tends to create towards underinvestment in 
compliance. Our fundamental point is that changes in managers’ pay along with 
changes in directors’ pay mean that the balance of concern about 
overinvestment versus underinvestment in corporate compliance has shifted 
toward the latter. 
E. Lack of Guidance from Delaware Courts 
The second rationale for Caremark’s approach was that the courts might 
square the circle of liability and incentives by giving non-binding guidance 
about best practices. The Caremark opinion itself went out of its way to 
provide guidance that was unnecessary for the decision in hand but would be 
useful to directors who were seeking to perform their roles in good faith. It is 
worth reflecting on the extent to which this sort of approach has been reflected 
in the subsequent case law. 
We reviewed all Delaware judicial opinions over twenty years following 
Caremark (through 2017) that involved litigation of oversight duties. Our 
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searches revealed 41 cases giving rise to one or more opinions,208 of which 
almost all (39) had the procedural posture of a motion to dismiss.209 In 32 
(82%) of these motions to dismiss, the motion was successful.210 Only 9 cases 
have yielded opinions concluding that, assuming the truth of particularized 
facts alleged in the plaintiff’s pleadings, the case should survive the initial 
screening of a motion to dismiss.211 Of these, 4 involved failures in ex ante 
monitoring—that is, total failure to establish any meaningful system of 
controls.212 A further 3 involved ex post oversight failures—namely, conscious 
disregard of ‘red flags’ indicating misconduct.213 The remaining 2 involved 
boards plausibly giving knowing support to corporate lawbreaking.214 
However, the only judicial guidance offered to parties in these opinions 
relates to whether the plaintiff has pleaded sufficiently particularized facts to 
sustain a reasonable likelihood that directors would face liability. A 
representative recent example is In re General Motors Company Derivative 
Litigation,215 in which Vice-Chancellor Glasscock noted: 
 
208.  Where a case was appealed and resulted in multiple opinions, we focus on the highest 
court in which the case was heard. 
209.  See Appendix II for the cases. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Two of these cases had a different procedural posture. In re Massey Energy Co. 
Derivative and Class Action Litig., No. 5430-VCS, 2011 WL 2176479 (Del. Ch. 2011) (request for 
preliminary injunction to restrain merger); ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta, No. 489-N, 2006 
WL 4782272 (Del. Ch. 2006) (trial on the merits). 
212.  Rich ex rel. Fuqi International, Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963 (Del. Ch. 2013); In 
re China Agritech, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514 (Del. Ch. 2013); 
In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009); ATR-Kim Eng, 2006 WL 4782272. 
213.  Stewart v. Wilmington Tr. SP Servs., 112 A.3d 271 (Del. Ch. 2015); Massey Energy, 
2011 WL 2176479; Saito v. McCall, No. 17132-NC, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
214.  Louisiana Muni. Police Employees’ Reti. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313 (Del. Ch. 2012); 
Kandell ex rel. FXCM, Inc. v. Niv, No. 11812-VCG, 2017 WL 4334149 (Del. Ch. 2017); see also City 
of Birmingham Ret. and Relief Sys. v. Good, 177 A.3d 47, 65 (Del. 2017) (Strine, C.J., dissenting). 
215.  No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 3958724 (Del. Ch. 2015). See also, e.g., Horman v. Abney, 
2017 WL 242571 at *8 (Del. Ch. 2017) (“The Audit Committee’s Charter, also referenced in the 
Complaint, establishes that the Audit Committee’s general responsibility for oversight includes 
oversight of ‘the Company’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements . . . .’ Thus, the 
Complaint itself reveals that the Plaintiffs have not plead particularized facts that the Board ‘utterly’ 
failed to adopt or implement any reporting and compliance systems.”); South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 18 
(Del. Ch. 2012) (“The complaint … pleads affirmatively that the Board established a Safety Committee 
and charged the committee with (i) reviewing health, safety and environmental policies . . . . These pled 
facts do not support an inference of an ‘utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exists,’ but rather the opposite.”); In re Lear Corp., 967 A.2d 640, 654 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(“The complaint makes clear that the Lear board held regular meetings and received advice from several 
relevant experts. The plaintiffs have therefore not come close to pleading facts suggesting that the Lear 
directors ‘consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities’ and thereby breached their 
duty of loyalty.”); David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Acct. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 1449-N, 2006 WL 391931 
at *5 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“The plaintiff conceded at oral argument that Citigroup had a wide range of 
compliance systems in place, and that they had no reason to believe that these systems were not 
functioning in a basic sense.”); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506-07 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[The 
plaintiff’s] conclusory complaint is empty of the kind of fact pleading that is critical to a Caremark 
claim, such as contentions that the company lacked an audit committee, that the company had an audit 
committee that met only sporadically and devoted patently inadequate time to its work, or that the audit 
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The Complaint does not allege a total lack of any reporting system at GM; 
rather, the Plaintiffs allege the reporting system should have transmitted certain 
pieces of information, namely, specific safety issues and reports from outside 
counsel regarding potential punitive damages. In other words, GM had a system 
for reporting risk to the Board, but in the Plaintiffs’ view it should have been a 
better system. Contentions that the Board did not receive specific types of 
information do not establish that the Board utterly failed “to attempt to assure a 
reasonable information and reporting system exists”. . . .216 
 
Given that the bar for monitoring obligations is set so low, showing a 
breach of duty in relation to ex ante monitoring requires plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that the board had failed to ensure that their firm had any sort of 
compliance program. Consequently, the judicial discussions restrict themselves 
to defining egregious malpractice, as opposed to providing any guidance on 
good practice.217 Consequently, there is little basis for the view that Delaware 
courts take the opportunity to provide guidance to boards without triggering 
liability, in the context of oversight duties.218 
F. Mixed Messages from Elsewhere 
The absence of guidance from Delaware courts leaves a vacuum in 
corporate law regarding what effective board engagement with compliance 
should look like. Other enforcement agencies, however, have not been so 
reticent. The most notable has been the trend for prosecutors to include 
stipulations about compliance programs in deferred and nonprosecution 
agreements (DPAs).219 Prosecutors and firms enter into these joint agreements 
whereby the authorities vow not to proceed with prosecution in return for the 
payment of a penalty by the firm and other undertakings. As discussed in Part I, 
 
committee had clear notice of serious accounting irregularities and simply chose to ignore them or, even 
worse, to encourage their continuation.”). 
216.  General Motors, 2015 WL 3958724 at *2. 
217.  See Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, 66 A.3d at 983 (indicating that the Audit Committee exerted 
no control over company’s operations in China, where its sole asset, a Chinese jewelry company, was 
located); China Agritech, 2013 WL 2181514, at *19-20 (indicating that the Audit Committee never 
met); American International, 965 A.2d at 799 (finding the “diversity, pervasiveness, and materiality” of 
misconduct so extensive that the relevant directors must have realized internal controls were 
inadequate); ATR-Kim Eng, 2006 WL 4782272, at *19 (finding that there was no reporting system in 
place and that the board did not meet regularly and deferred entirely to the chairman and controlling 
shareholder). 
218.  As we discuss below, three very recent Delaware cases may open the way to more 
explicit standards for ex ante compliance. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis 
Oncology, No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2019) (compliance oversight is 
“especially” important “when a monoline company operates in a highly regulated industry”). In re 
Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litig., No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2019). 
219.  See generally GARRETT, supra note 53, at 58-70; Arlen & Kahan, supra note 11, at 330-
43; Kaal & Lacine, supra note 38, at 61, 72-83. 
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whether or not the firm has an effective compliance program is a relevant 
consideration for whether prosecutors will be willing to agree to a DPA rather 
than proceed with prosecution.220 However, it is only one of many factors, 
another of which is the firm’s willingness to improve its practices in light of the 
discovery of misconduct.221 In many DPAs, firms’ compliance programs are 
judged to be ineffective by prosecutors, but the firm undertakes to improve its 
practices going forward by way of “remediation.”222 The remedial actions taken 
are then scrutinized by a “corporate monitor,” a professional, appointed by the 
prosecutor, whose role is to oversee the implementation of an improved 
compliance regime.223 
The undertakings by firms in DPAs regarding compliance are the result of 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. As such, they give no generalizable 
guidance to other firms as to what best practice might involve. Moreover, such 
agreements are outside the rule of law.224 In a recent paper, Arlen and Kahan 
question the justification for such discretionary exercises, concluding that one 
possible justification may be that agency costs within the firm mean that its 
managers have insufficient incentives to implement compliance programs.225 
We agree that agency costs justify intervention to enhance compliance 
incentives and share their assessment that DPAs are a distinctly second-best 
way to do so.226 However, we view the phenomenon as a response to 
widespread incentive problems in corporate boards regarding compliance and, 
specifically, the absence of any imperative from corporate law for boards to 
take further action. 
A second channel of agency activism has been administrative enforcement 
against individual executives. Most notable in this arena has been SEC 
enforcement in relation to compliance with securities regulation.227 A series of 
recent enforcement actions have pronounced CEOs’ conduct to have been 
negligent.228 While these decisions are not beyond the rule of law, they create a 
 
220.  See supra, notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
221.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 59, § 9-28.740, § 9-28.1000. 
222.  See Kaal & Lacine, supra note 38, at 44-47 (finding that 75% of N/DPAs in a sample 
over the period from 1993 to 2013 contained undertakings by the firm to implement, or improve, a 
compliance program) 
223.  Id. (finding that corporate monitors were appointed in 46% of N/DPAs). 
224.  See Arlen, supra note 39, at 76–81; Copeland, supra note 39; Garrett, supra note 38, at 
853. 
225.  Arlen & Kahan, supra note 11, at 354-66. 
226.  Id. at 375-85. 
227.  See generally Court E. Golumbia, “The Big Chill”: Personal Liability and the Targeting 
of Financial Sector Compliance Officers, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (2017); Public Statement, Luis A. 
Aguilar, Comm’r of the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Role of Chief Compliance Officers Must be 
Supported (June 29, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/supporting-role-of-chief-compliance-
officers.html [https://perma.cc/EC2B-VDZR]. 
228.  Most of these proceedings involve executives of investment advisory firms censured for 
failure to adopt, implement, and review written policies and procedures and a code of ethics reasonably 
designed to prevent violations under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. See SFX Fin. Advisory 
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different problem: the incentives to implement compliance become sectoral and 
driven by the agendas of functional regulators as opposed to being integrated 
within the firm’s business model. This understanding makes it difficult for 
firms to think about compliance systems in a holistic way. Instead, firms 
respond in disparate and unconnected ways to a series of imperatives imposed 
by subject-matter agencies.229 Greater incentives from corporate law would 
encourage firms to take a more holistic approach to the development of their 
compliance programs. 
VI. The Case for a “Compliance Clawback” 
A. A Self-Limiting Liability Proposal 
As we have shown, the increasing importance of stock-based 
compensation and an evolving sense of the duties of public company directors 
mean the framework established by Caremark is ripe for reconsideration. 
However, such reconsideration needs to bear in mind two points. First, the 
policy concerns reflected in Caremark are still important: the development of 
Caremark duties must be sensitive to genuine concerns about defensive 
decision-making and doubts about the institutional competence of judges to 
review directors’ decisions.230 Second, the freedom of the Delaware Chancery 
Court to evolve precedent in this area is constrained by section 102(b)(7) of the 
DGCL, which permits companies to exculpate directors for breach of duties not 
involving bad faith or disloyalty. In this Part, we articulate a way forward that 
would give directors more effective incentives to engage in compliance 
oversight while being responsive to these concerns. 
The general concern about defensive decision-making is that if directors 
face greater liability, they will be less willing to take on risky business projects. 
Of course, in most contexts, liability for failures in compliance oversight would 
not affect decision-making in relation to “ordinary” business decisions, in the 
sense of setting strategy and selecting business projects. The goals of the 
business judgment rule would be preserved. 
 
Mgmt. Enters. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-16591 (imposing fine of $25,000 on the CCO of 
investment adviser); Pekin Singer Strauss Asset Mgmt. Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-16646 (June 
23, 2015) (imposing fines of $45,000 each on the President, Chairman and Co-CEO of investment 
adviser); Blackrock Advisors, LLC, SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-16501 (Apr. 20, 2015) (imposing 
fine of $60,000 on the CCO of investment adviser); Equitas Capital Advisors, LLC, SEC Admin. 
Proceeding No. 3-15585 (Oct. 23, 2013) (imposing fine of $35,000 on the CEO of investment adviser); 
Wunderlich Securities, Inc., SEC Admin. Proceeding No. 3-14403 (May 27, 2011) (imposing fines of 
$50,000 and $45,000 respectively on the CCO and CEO of an investment adviser). 
229.  Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 
(2017). 
230.  See supra Section V.C. 
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A more specific version of the concern about defensive decision-making 
is that liability for failures in compliance oversight may lead directors to cause 
their firms to overinvest in compliance.231 This is because spending the 
company’s money on compliance would insure directors against potential 
liability. Of course, up to a point, this is exactly what liability should do: our 
claim is that boards currently lack sufficient incentives to oversee compliance. 
However, the concern is that heightening the Caremark standard would cause 
boards to flip from too little to too much expenditure. 
This concern about overinvestment in compliance is strongest if directors 
face liability measured by the amount of penalties paid out by the corporation 
following a compliance failure. Such penalties are set by reference to the social 
harm caused by the corporate misconduct in question, rather than the marginal 
incentives of directors overseeing the firm’s activities. Average fines for 
corporations convicted of a federal crime are in excess of twelve million 
dollars,232 and when disgorgement, forfeiture, restitution, and liabilities in 
follow-on civil lawsuits are included, a corporation’s total financial liabilities 
following prosecution can easily be ten times this amount.233 Making directors 
personally liable in this payment, even with a small probability, would likely 
outweigh the current incentives for underinvestment in compliance, as total 
variable compensation is far less than this amount. 
To avoid triggering overinvestment in compliance, we suggest framing 
liability not in terms of “compensating” the corporation for its financial 
exposure—in relation to which the directors’ causal contribution will have been 
minor—but rather in terms of “clawing back” or disgorging the directors’ 
variable compensation earned on the basis of inadequate compliance 
oversight.234 In contrast to standard loss-based measures, liability measured in 
this way is self-limiting in quantum: no director will face financial exposure 
exceeding what she has received from the firm in the form of stock 
compensation.235 Rather, the remedy for failures in compliance oversight tracks 
the potential benefit to the director from short-changing compliance. This 
symmetry means that the liability solution tracks the compensation problem. 
 
231.  See, e.g., Elson & Gyves, supra note 176. 
232.  GARRETT, supra note 53, at 292 fig. A.1 (detailing the average corporate fines from 
1994 to 2012). 
233.  Id. at 294. 
234.  “Compliance clawbacks” have been previously been proposed for executives. See, e.g., 
Langevoort, supra note 31, at 733; W. Robert Thomas, The Ability and Responsibility of Corporate Law 
to Improve Criminal Fines, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 601, 647-50 (2017). Such clawbacks can and should be 
included in executive compensation agreements negotiated by boards. Our proposal, by contrast, would 
apply to directors, in order to encourage their engagement with compliance oversight—including the 
negotiation of such clauses for executives. 
235.  To be sure, the loss to a director found liable would also include reputational damage, 
but this easily quantifiable metric would have the valuable benefit of permitting firms to assess more 
clearly the extent of an individual’s propensity to engage with compliance concerns. 
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Moreover, liability to disgorge compensation gains resonates with traditional 
gain-based remedies for breach of the duty of loyalty. 
B. What Does “Effective” Compliance Look Like? 
Institutional competence concerns about director liability center on the 
court’s lack of expertise with respect to corporate decisions. Permitting the 
court to determine what constitutes an “inadequate” decision will encourage 
directors to please judges, and if judges are less competent than directors 
themselves, will reduce the quality of decision-making. 
However, in the context of compliance oversight, this general concern is 
attenuated. A specific problem for compliance oversight is that there is no clear 
consensus as to what a socially optimal—or even an “effective” in the sense of 
reducing expected corporate penalties—compliance program looks like.236 
Unlike general business decisions, directors’ incentives vis-à-vis compliance 
oversight do not track shareholder returns. The problems discussed in Part II 
mean that directors’ judgment regarding compliance programs is likely 
systematically biased toward underinvestment. There is no a priori reason for 
thinking that courts will do a worse job of setting parameters for compliance 
investment than will directors themselves. 
Moreover, the choice is not simply between directors and courts. As we 
saw in Section V.F, corporate law’s hesitancy in policing directors’ oversight 
responsibilities has effectively ceded the field for developing notions of 
“effective” compliance to an ad hoc range of interventions by prosecutors. 
While the costs of engaging with the question of what sort of compliance 
program is effective may be high, the costs of not doing so—and leaving this to 
prosecutorial discretion—are arguably higher. 
A compliance clawback could be implemented in a variety of ways, 
opening a range of possible institutional fora—with differing competencies—
for assessment of whether a “failure” had occurred. Our preference is for an 
alternative dispute resolution procedure that would, over time, generate 
learning about compliance regimes that might usefully inform practice as well 
as instill accountability. For example, if a firm resolves a compliance 
enforcement action, criminal or civil, through payment of a fine or acceptance 
of some other sanction, an appropriate board committee, perhaps the 
governance committee, should trigger an “accountability proceeding.” This 
proceeding could be presided over by a panel of compliance and industry 
experts, perhaps three, who would conduct an internal investigation that would 
(i) evaluate the compliance system within the firm as well as the particulars of 
the compliance failure, (ii) assess the extent of directors’ responsibility 
(including differential responsibility of particular directors where appropriate 
 
236.  See supra Section II.B. 
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based on differential access to information or expertise), and (iii) determine the 
appropriate clawback of the accumulated stock of responsible former and 
current directors. In other words, the panel would consider the board’s 
engagement at both the ex ante stage of compliance oversight, including the 
integration of the compliance regime to the firm’s business model, and the ex 
post stage, including the board’s alertness to any red flags. The panel’s findings 
and determinations should be made public. This proceeding would weigh and 
assess responsibility in an expert way. And crucially, it would help generate 
case studies to aid future parties’ understanding of what makes for an effective 
compliance regime.237 
Clearly, this approach would not necessarily yield an optimal balance of 
the competing policy considerations discussed. As we stated previously, there 
is no magic formula for an “effective” compliance regime.238 Our claim is more 
modest: it would deliver an improvement on the current, manifestly suboptimal, 
position. 
C. The Supply of Directors 
An oft-voiced concern is that greater liability would chill the supply of 
qualified directors. We consider that this argument has no real force 
independent of the more powerful concerns discussed above. Provided that the 
quantum of liability is measurable in advance, and that it is clear what directors 
must do to avoid it, then any concerns new board members may have about 
potential liability can be met through negotiations over their pay. Our proposal 
meets the first of these conditions, and we believe will make a credible job of 
meeting the second. 
Moreover, a number of precedents exist for the imposition of liability in 
the form we propose—or even more extensively—without having had adverse 
effects on board recruitment. Executives of U.S. public companies have been at 
risk for clawbacks since 2002 for incentive-based payments that are based on 
 
237.  Why focus liability innovation on directors rather than officers or other employees, who 
presumably are directly implicated in the compliance failures? We here focus on directors because of 
their particular role as evolved under the monitoring board model, which depends in part on the 
reputational bond that an independent director implicitly posts. It is not just the monetary sanction from 
a clawback but also the possibility of a negative assessment by credible adjudicators that we think will 
evoke stronger and more effective compliance oversight. Part of that is likely to include executive 
compensation contracts that strengthen clawback provisions for compliance failures relative to current 
practice. Presumably one element of an effective compliance regime is compensation arrangements with 
responsible officers and employees that are incentive-compatible with compliance. But see Jesse Fried & 
Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 722 (2011) (discussing clawbacks for executives); 
supra note 234. To be effective, the “accountability assessment” regime (with the potential for 
clawback) should be triggered virtually automatically upon a significant compliance sanction imposed 
upon the firm, such as a significant monetary penalty or an activity restriction. 
238.  See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra. 
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accounting fraud,239 and the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 extended this potential 
liability to include all cases of accounting misstatement.240 The U.K.’s 
Financial Conduct Authority’s new Senior Managers Regime for banks, in 
force since 2016, imposes on senior executives and directors with delegated 
responsibilities a “duty of responsibility” for compliance within their area of 
authority (defined objectively).241 The duty, which has been extended to senior 
managers of all U.K. financial-services firms as of yearend 2018, is enforceable 
by the regulator, and breaches may be met not only with disgorgement of 
compensation but also unlimited fines.242 While this goes considerably further 
than anything we propose here, it does not appear to have resulted in U.K. 
banks failing to attract senior managers, although they are needing to pay more 
to do so.243 
 
239.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 304 (stating that the SEC is authorized to seek clawback 
of performance-based compensation from the CEO and CFO in cases of accounting restatement 
accompanied by misconduct in financial reporting); see SEC v. Jensen, 835 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir 2016). 
Because SEC action is required to obtain the clawback in such cases, this provision is widely regarded 
as ineffective. See Jesse M. Fried, Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback (Eur. Corp. Gov. Inst., 
Working Paper No. 876, 2016) (finding that in over 8,000 financial restatements during the decade 
following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC recovered pay from only six executives who had 
not personally engaged in misconduct) 
240.  Dodd-Frank Act, 31 U.S.C § 78j-4 (2018) (requiring issuers to develop a clawback 
policy for excess incentive-based based pay in light of a material restatement of financial results). An 
SEC rule proposal in 2015 to implement the section specifically was not adopted. Nevertheless, firms 
are adopting what some have called “quasi-clawbacks.” See SHEARMAN & STERLING, Embracing the 
Quasi-Clawback (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2018/04/embracing-the-
quasi-clawback [https://perma.cc/LVG8-NGE9]. Clawbacks have also been implemented by boards 
(such as the Wells Fargo board) when notorious lapses generated sufficient shareholder pressure. See 
John C. Coffee, Shareholder Activism in the Era of Trump: What Strategy Works?, COLUM. BLUE SKY 
BLOG (Nov. 21, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/11/21/shareholder-activism-in-the-era-
of-trump-what-strategy-works/ [https://perma.cc/ZR3X-67SG]. 
241.  See Policy Statement, Financial Cond. Auth. (Eng.), Guidance on the duty of 
responsibility (May 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps17-09.pdf [perma.cc/8J73-
MNKQ]; Policy Statement, Fin. Conduct Auth. (Eng.), The Duty of Responsibility for insurers and FCA 
solo-regulated firms, CP17/42 (2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publications/policy-statements/ps18-16-
duty-of-responsibility [perma.cc/6ACD-B7NV]. 
242.  Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 3, § 66A(5)(d) (Eng.). 
243.  While some anecdotal evidence suggests the new regime is making recruitment of key 
compliance staff more difficult, See, e.g., Jennifer Thompson, Accountability Rules Hit Hiring of Senior 
Staff, Says Recruiter, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/0f73d1da-89a9-11e7-
8bb1-5ba57d47eff7 [https://perma.cc/VMM3-X6YC], other anecdotes suggest compliance professionals 
find themselves “in a strong bargaining position,” See, e.g., Nick Evans, How Will the Senior Managers 
Regime Affect Compliance Jobs?, BARCLAY SIMPSON (Apr. 18, 2016), 
https://www.barclaysimpson.com/industrynews/how-will-the-senior-managers-regime-affect-
compliance-jobs-801816754 [https://perma.cc/7G2L-ML3H]. This view is consistent with a need to 
offer greater compensation and operational autonomy to attract personnel to roles carrying the new 
compliance responsibilities. 
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D. Implementing Compliance Clawbacks 
We see two routes by which compliance clawbacks in the form we have 
framed them could be implemented as a matter of corporate law: a “shareholder 
route” and a “judicial route.” Our preference is for the former. 
1. Shareholder Route 
As we have seen, directorial inattention to compliance ultimately harms 
investors as a group as well as society, because the firm is in the long run liable 
to pay a larger penalty. Suitably motivated shareholders have two 
complementary levers at their disposal to implement a compliance clawback. 
The first is that stock-exchange listing rules require shareholder approval of 
equity compensation plans.244 Under state law (Delaware in particular), 
shareholder approval of stock-based pay for directors seems a critical element 
in assuring that a business-judgment-rule standard rather than an entire-fairness 
standard governs in the event that such grants are subsequently challenged as 
excessive and resulting from director self-dealing.245 Shareholders, such as 
institutional investors, who believe that directors’ stock-based compensation 
should be subject to clawback in the event of compliance failures, could 
withhold their vote subject to appropriate undertakings in the plan documents 
for a decision procedure like the one described above. Since stock-based 
compensation raises loyalty concerns, it is appropriate for shareholders to set 
limits on the terms of such equity grants. 
A complementary tack would be for shareholders to add a clawback 
determination process through an amendment to corporate by-laws using the 
shareholder-initiative power under Delaware corporate law and similar such 
laws.246 This initiative would invite negotiation with the board over procedures 
that could workably set up the clawback scheme. Such a measure would be 
shareholder “self-help” that does not require legislative change or even 
widespread adoption across all firms. An organization like ISS or the Council 
on Institutional Investors might devise model by-law provisions that would be 
available for shareholder initiative. ISS might well initiate a consultation 
among its shareholder constituents to evaluate the demand for such a provision. 
Of course, the “shareholder route” to implementation of compliance 
clawbacks by shareholders relies on activist investors with a concern for the 
 
244.  See NASDAQ Listing Rule 5635(c) (2019); NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.08 
(2019). 
245.  The recent important cases are In re Investors Bancorp S’holder Litig., No. 12327-VCS, 
2017 WL 1277672 (Del. Ch. 2017). Calma v. Templeton, 114 A.3d 563 (Del. Ch. 2015) (Citrix); 
Espinoza v. Zuckerberg, 124 A.3d 47 (Del. Ch. 2015) (Facebook); and Seinfeld v. Slager, No. 6462-
VCG, 2012 WL 2501105 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Republic Services). 
246.  DEL. GEN. CORP. L. §109. 
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long-term interests of the company. The extent to which such activism exists or 
can be harnessed is beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that this 
route is nonviable if it cannot. We think that stronger compliance oversight 
should be an important priority of large institutions now interested in 
“stewardship.” Compliance failures at large public companies sour public 
sentiment about the legitimacy of a corporate governance system that 
prioritizes shareholder interests. A single firm’s compliance failure can in this 
way ramify across a diversified portfolio. Thus, asset managers whose core 
products are diversified portfolios of public company stock have a strong 
reason, from a customer perspective, to favor governance innovations that 
would reduce such risks.247 
2. Judicial Route 
A judicial route to implementing compliance clawbacks would be to 
characterize oversight of compliance as a conflict-of-interest issue where 
directors are compensated in stock. This would have the facially attractive 
feature of sidestepping the barrier erected by section 102(b)(7) because a 
conflict of interest is a duty of loyalty concern per se. However, if director 
stock compensation creates a conflict of interest over compliance issues, it is 
hard to see why it does not do so in relation to all other issues involving 
weighing short-term and long-term risk considerations.248 Courts have been 
chary of accepting such arguments in the past,249 on the basis that almost all 
 
247.  A reader may ask why we haven’t promoted a mandatory compliance disclosure remedy, 
particularly since a core feature of our compliance short-termism model is the market’s inability to price 
compliance risks because of a compliance disclosure shortfall. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive 
Compensation: If There is a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for “Compensation Discussion 
and Analysis,” 30 J. CORP. LAW 675 (2005). There is much to be said on behalf of a disclosure remedy, 
of course, but count us skeptical about the SEC’s willingness to initiate such a rulemaking. The 
compliance clawback remedy that we promote has the particular advantage that it could be implemented 
through shareholder self-help. “Stewardship” should indeed encompass governance measures that would 
increase law-compliance. A director compensation clawback regime promoted through shareholder 
initiative would induce directors to engage in tailored compliance planning. By contrast, an effective 
disclosure regime would depend on uniformity and monitoring that would require SEC action rather 
than shareholder self-help. An additional mechanism of shareholder self-help to increase the level of 
board compliance oversight would be to promote the adoption of board-level compliance committees via 
shareholder-adopted by-law proposals. We have elsewhere discussed the value of such committees. 
Armour et al., Board Compliance, supra note 94. 
248.  Two of us have indeed argued for such wider characterization elsewhere. John Armour 
& Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 37 (2014). However, 
we suggested that implementation would require modification of DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 102(b)(7). 
249.  See, e.g., Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812-15 (Sup. Ct. 1976) 
(“Certainly, every action taken by the Board has some impact on earnings and may therefore affect the 
compensation of those whose earnings are keyed to profits. That does not disqualify the inside directors, 
nor does it put every policy adopted by the Board in question. All directors have an obligation, using 
sound business judgment, to maximize income for the benefit of all persons having a stake in the welfare 
of the corporate entity.”). 
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decisions become subject to entire fairness review if compensation is taken as a 
basis for conflict of interest. 
An alternative path to judicial reconsideration of Caremark would be to 
embed more substantive content into the notion of “good faith.” A director, the 
argument would go, cannot say she is acting in good faith to pursue her 
company’s interests—consistently with her duty of loyalty—if she neglects the 
most “basic and obvious” elements of her job. By adding substance to the 
“basic and obvious” elements, the Chancery Court could map a route by which 
compliance-specific obligations can be heightened, consistent with section 
102(b)(7). Delaware courts have on several occasions stated that such 
substantive development would undermine section 102(b)(7)’s concern with the 
supply of qualified directors.250 However, as Section VI.C argues, these 
concerns have little independent force. Moreover, in various other cases, 
Delaware Chancery judges have been willing to read modest substantive 
content into the notion of “good faith.”251 
Thus, we are encouraged by three recent (2019) Delaware cases that build 
out the “good faith” standard to heighten directors’ compliance oversight duties 
where regulatory compliance relates to core features of the company’s 
business. This is where compliance may matter most and the pressures to short-
change compliance are most intense. In Marchand v. Barnhill,252 the Delaware 
Supreme Court (en banc) overturned a Chancery Court ruling that dismissed, 
on familiar Caremark grounds, a claim that the board of Blue Bell Creameries 
had neglected its oversight duties prior to a Listeria outbreak. The outbreak 
resulted in a shutdown of the company’s ice cream manufacturing plants and a 
subsequent massive equity dilution to rescue the company. While sticking to 
the familiar Caremark rhetoric, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the 
board has a duty to establish a compliance oversight system attuned to the 
comprehensive regulatory scheme that governs its core business—here, the 
food safety regime for its only product, ice cream.253 Chief Justice Shrine, 
writing for the court, put it this way: 
 
250.  See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“By reinforcing that 
a scienter-based standard applies to claims in the delicate monitoring context, Stone ensured that the 
protections that exculpatory charter provisions afford to independent directors against damage claims 
would not be eroded.”) 
251.  See, e.g., Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, 66 A.3d 963, 983 (Del. Ch. 2013) (concluding that, 
despite the Board’s establishment of an Audit Committee, the company’s admission of “incorrect and 
untimely movements of inventory” evinced, given the importance of inventory control to a jewelry 
company, the absence of “any meaningful controls”); Saito v. MacCall, 2004 WL 3029876, at *7 n.71 
(Del. Ch. 2004) (“A committee of the board, acting in good faith, would have openly communicated 
with each other concerning the accounting problems Andersen disclosed and would have shared the 
information with the entire McKesson HBOC board.”). 
252. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019). 
253. The complaint included allegations that there had been “no board committee that 
addressed food safety… [and] no regular process or protocols that required management to keep the 
board apprised of food safety compliance practice, risks or reports…” Id. at 822. The lack of an 
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Although Caremark may not require as much as some commentators wish, it 
does require that a board make a good faith effort to put in place a reasonable 
system of monitoring and reporting about the corporation’s central compliance 
risks. In Blue Bell’s case, food safety was essential and mission critical. The 
complaint pled facts supporting a fair inference that no board-level system of 
monitoring or reporting on food safety existed.254 
 
Shortly after Marchand, the Chancery Court held, in In re Clovis 
Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation,255 that in the case of “a monoline 
company that operates in a highly regulated industry” the board has a 
heightened compliance oversight duty. Clovis Oncology, an “upstart 
biopharmaceutical company,” had one promising anti-cancer drug in a clinical 
trial. The complaint alleged that the board ignored red flags that company 
personnel were not following the required protocol and misled investors as to 
the likely outcome of the clinical trial. The company’s monitoring system was 
sufficient to funnel sufficient trial-relevant information to the board; the board 
(on the allegations) failed Caremark’s ex post compliance-oversight obligation 
of following up on warning signs as they emerge. The court elaborates on the 
heightened standard in Marchand as follows: 
 
[W]hen a company operates in an environment where externally imposed 
regulations govern its “mission critical” operations, the board’s oversight 
functional must be more rigorously exercised. . . . [E]ven in this context 
Caremark does not demand omniscience. But it does demand a “good faith effort 
to implement an oversight system and then monitor it.” This entails a sensitivity 
to “compliance issue[s] intrinsically critical to the company[].”256 
 
The basis for the purported compliance oversight failure in the other 
recent litigation from Delaware, In re Facebook, Inc. Section 220 Litigation,257 
was the board’s alleged failure to monitor Facebook’s adherence to an FTC 
consent decree entered into in 2011 that required the company to implement 
“more robust and verifiable security protocols.”258 Some years later, in 2015, 
Cambridge Analytica, the British political-consulting firm “poached” the 
private data of fifty million Facebook users, and it was subsequently reported 
 
adequate board oversight mechanism was evidenced by the fact that “during a key period leading up to 
the deaths of three customers, management received reports that contained what could be considered 
red, or at least yellow, flags” and yet the board was not informed. Id. Additionally, “the board meetings 
[were] devoid of any suggestion that there was any regular discussion of food safety issues.” Id. 
254.  Id. at 824 (footnote omitted). 
255.  No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch. 2019). 
256.  Id. at 36. 
257.  No. 2018-0661-JRS, 2019 WL 2320842 (Del. Ch. 2019). 
258.  Id. at *1. 
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that Facebook’s business model included incentives to monetize users’ data 
without their consent.259 The decided case was preliminary: plaintiffs had met 
the “some evidence” standard necessary to obtain greater access to Facebook’s 
books and records to develop a case that might satisfy the Caremark standard. 
What is important is the Court’s suggestion that the specific compliance 
obligation of the consent decree gave rise to a matching specific compliance 
oversight duty on the board: 
 
In the wake of the Consent Decree, Facebook was under a positive obligation to 
take specific steps to protect its users’ private data. That obligation was firmly in 
place at the time of the Cambridge Analytica breach. Delaware courts 
traditionally have viewed stockholder allegations that a board failed to oversee 
the company’s obligation to comply with positive law, or positive regulatory 
mandates, more favorably in the Caremark paradigm than allegations that a 
board failed to oversee the company’s efforts generally to avoid business risk.260 
 
Of these developments, Clovis Oncology suggests that Marchand may 
open the door to much deeper judicial engagement with the particulars of how 
boards monitor and oversee a company’s obligation to comply with law, 
particularly those regulatory schemes that address core elements of the 
company’s business. Putting the cases together, as the regulatory thicket 
deepens, boards have a duty to implement a sufficient monitoring system 
(Marchand)—buttressing the ex ante standard—and to monitor the outputs 
(Clovis Oncology)—buttressing the ex post standard. Consent decree 
compliance (Facebook) is a specific form of critical regulation that requires 
heightened compliance oversight both ex ante and ex post. 
There is a final judicial avenue to consider. Compliance oversight 
responsibilities do not rest on fiduciary duties alone. As noted above, 
corporations are obliged under the Delaware General Corporation Law to limit 
themselves to “lawful activities.” Directors have a direct statutory duty, per 
section 141(a), to manage or oversee the management of the “business and 
affairs” of the corporation. What could be more fundamental to this duty than 
to undertake appropriate oversight of the corporation’s compliance with law?261 
If neither shareholder self-help nor judicial engagement is pursued, there 
remains a third, “default” option: prosecutors will continue to seek to give teeth 
to compliance obligations through ad hoc negotiated settlements with firms. 
This approach is, for the reasons discussed in Section V.F, distinctly inferior to 
 
259.  Id. 
260.  Id. at *2-3. 
261.  This thought may undergird Vice Chancellor Sights’ opinion in Facebook Securities 220 
Litigation: “Plaintiffs have presented a credible basis to infer that the Board acted with disobedience by 
allowing Facebook to violate the Consent Decree. They are entitled to inspect books and records to 
investigate that potential wrongdoing.” Id. at *15. 
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an approach whereby corporate law gives boards incentives to take the 
initiative in fleshing out the scope of their compliance programs. Doing 
nothing, in other words, is not an option. 
VII. Conclusion 
To return to an important theme: Serious law violations by corporate 
actors in which responsibility is so diffuse that no one is responsible are 
corrosive of the long-term viability of a regime focused on shareholder value. 
The directors, as monitors, need to step up. They have voted for and approved 
executive compensation packages laden with high-powered stock-based 
incentives, which carry risks for evasion of law. They have approved stock-
based compensation for themselves. The political economy that sustains 
economic decision-making by private firms depends, over the long-term, on a 
popular belief that those responsible for controlling corporate misbehavior are 
personally at risk when compliance fails. The scheme we propose will provide 
a measure of public “settling up.” A system of expert evaluators of the 
directors’ performance in compliance oversight, combined with appropriate 
liability limits, strikes a reasonable balance. This is a system that shareholders 
can create even if courts do not. We think it would count as a meaningful act of 
“stewardship” to move forward on this proposal, particularly since the 
stewardship goal is to facilitate long-term socialwealth maximization. 
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Appendix I: General Model for Nondisclosure 
Assumptions 
We make the following assumptions. Firms vary according to their 
likelihood of attracting the attention of public enforcers. Absent a compliance 
program, “high-risk” firms face an expected enforcement penalty 𝑝!, whereas 
“low-risk” firms face an expected enforcement penalty 𝑝!, where 𝑝! > 𝑝! > 0. 
For simplicity, all parties are assumed to be risk neutral, and the time value of 
money is nil. 
The proportion of the population of firms that is high-risk is 𝜑 (0 < 𝜑 <
1), and the proportion that is low-risk is (1 −  𝜑). The value of 𝜑 is common 
knowledge for both managers and investors. Sources of variance in risk of 
enforcement are grounded in aspects of firms’ business practices that are 
observable to managers but not to investors. These include matters such as the 
pre-hiring checks on the integrity of employees, how employee compensation 
practices operate, and so forth. 
An effective compliance program costs high-risk firms 𝑐! and low-risk 
firms 𝑐! to implement, where 𝑐! >  𝑐! > 0. Compliance activity has no net 
effect on expected probability of enforcement (it reduces expected incidence, 
but increases expected detection rate, of misconduct). However, having an 
effective compliance program in place leads prosecuting authorities to discount 
the penalty if enforcement occurs. This discount is never complete, so we 
denote it as 𝜎 0 <  𝜎 < 0.5 . A firm of type 𝑖, (𝑖 ∈ ℎ, 𝑙 ) with an effective 
compliance program in place consequently lowers its expected enforcement 
penalty to (1 −  𝜎)𝑝!. A firm that has a compliance program which is 
ineffective, however, receives no discount. To focus the remainder of the 
discussion on economically interesting cases, we restrict the analysis to cases 
where it is value-maximizing for firms to implement a compliance program, i.e. 
for firm 𝑖, 𝜎𝑝! > 𝑐! . 
Timeline 
There are two periods. At the beginning of the first period (t = 0), the 
firm’s market capitalization is 𝑣. A manager of a firm of type 𝑖 is tasked with 
reviewing whether or not the firm should implement a compliance program 
costing 𝑐!. Any approved expenditure is spent by the firm during the first 
period. 
At the end of the first period (t = 1), the firm’s financial statements are 
published. Accounting rules do not require disclosure of compliance 
expenditure as a separate category, but firms may choose to disclose such 
information voluntarily. 
At the end of the second period (t = 2), the firm is potentially the subject 
of a criminal investigation. Firms that have not invested in compliance 
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programs incur a penalty with expected cost 𝑝!, whereas firms that have 
invested in a compliance program incur only (1 −  𝜎)𝑝!. 
Analysis 
Long-term value maximization 
Consider first the benchmark case where managers are motivated to 
maximize the firm’s expected value at the end of the second period (t = 2). The 
decision whether to establish a compliance program can be treated similarly to 
any other capital budgeting decision for the firm. Under our assumptions, it is 
value-maximizing for firm 𝑖 to implement a compliance program because 
𝜎𝑝! > 𝑐! . Investment in compliance yields the firm an expected ‘return’ at 
period 2 equal to 𝜎𝑝! − 𝑐! . 
Managerial Short-Termism 
We now consider how the analysis changes if the managers are paid in 
stock, which vests in period 1. The managers now have incentives to focus not 
on the firm’s value in period 2, but on its market capitalization in period 1. 
Disclosure and revelation. At t = 0, investors do not know firm 𝑖’s type. 
However, if the firm discloses its level of compliance expenditure at t = 1, this 
will reveal its type at that point. Because high-risk firms face a greater residual 
expected enforcement penalty than do low-risk firms, this revelation will cause 
the market capitalization of low-risk firms to increase and that of high-risk 
firms to decrease. This revelation effect will be salient for managers who are 
concerned with maximizing the market capitalization at t = 1. 
Disclosure decision. Might managers of a high-risk firm choose simply to 
disclose lower compliance costs than their firm actually incurred? If a high-risk 
firm invests in a compliance program costing 𝑐! but only discloses 𝑐! of 
compliance costs, could high-risk firms continue to pool their market valuation 
with low-risk firms at t = 1? It seems unlikely that managers would procure 
their firm to misstate its overall expenditure, as this would subject them to 
personal civil and criminal liability for securities fraud. More plausibly, they 
might take advantage of the fact that firms are not required to disclose 
compliance expenditure as such simply to allocate the costs to other 
categories—for example, general employment costs. However, this action will 
also be unfruitful because investors will treat the additional expenditures 
simply as reducing earnings going forwards, which will also lower the firm’s 
valuation.262 Consequently, managers may be expected to support truthful 
 
262.  Indeed, investors may be able to infer the firm’s type from the presence of an 
unexplained earnings shock in period 1. 
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disclosures in period 1. This then calls into question the impact of 
compensation incentives on the decision regarding investment in compliance. 
Compliance decision. In light of the analysis of the disclosure decision, 
consider now how the managers’ concerns about revelation at t = 1 may affect 
their incentives regarding the compliance investment decision at t = 0. 
Managers of high-risk firms may be tempted to implement only a compliance 
program of the sort that would be adequate for a low-risk firm, but not a high-
risk firm. Such firms would then (truthfully) disclose compliance expenditures 
of 𝑐!. Investors would not now be able to distinguish between high and low-risk 
firms at t = 1. 
However, this results in high-risk firms not expending enough resources 
on compliance to deliver an effective compliance program. Note that for a 
high-risk firm to spend only 𝑐!  does not maximize the firm’s expected value at t 
= 2. This provides only an ineffective compliance program, which does not 
generate any reduction in penalties from the authorities should enforcement 
occur at t = 2. A high-risk firm that spends only 𝑐!  on compliance consequently 
reduces its expected value at t = 2, relative to a high-risk firm that spends 𝑐! , by 
𝜎𝑝! − 𝑐! − 𝑐! . That is, the firm foregoes the opportunity to receive a discount 
on expected enforcement costs through having had an effective compliance 
program, and wastes resources on an ineffective compliance program. 
Rational investors will infer that if all firms disclose 𝑐!, then with 
probability 𝜑, a firm making low compliance expenditure is in fact high-risk. 
Investors will expect firms’ average expected compliance and residual 
enforcement costs under these circumstances to be as follows: 
 
1 − 𝜑 ( 1 − 𝜎 𝑝! + 𝑐!) + 𝜑 𝑝! + 𝑐!   (1) 
 
This is the probability-weighted mean of low-risk firms which implement 
effective compliance programs, and high-risk firms which do not (and so 
receive no discount to their expected enforcement penalties) and which incur 
wasteful expenditure on ineffective compliance in order to mimic low-risk 
firms. 
If managers of a high-risk firm choose to invest 𝑐! , they will reveal the 
firm’s type at t = 1. Investors will assess the firm’s expected compliance and 
residual enforcement costs as follows: 
 
1 −  𝜎 𝑝! + 𝑐! (2) 
 
Managers of high-risk firms focused on maximizing the firm’s market 
capitalization at t = 1 will consequently only choose to invest 𝑐! if the firm’s 
expected compliance and residual enforcement costs from implementing the 
high-quality compliance program (2) are less than investors’ assessment of 
these costs for the blended population average (1). Conversely, it follows that 
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managers of high-risk firms will choose only to invest 𝑐!, and mimic a low-risk 
firm’s compliance investment, where the following condition (from (1) and (2)) 
holds: 
 
1 −  𝜎 𝑝! + 𝑐! >  1 − 𝜑 ((1 −  𝜎)𝑝! + 𝑐!) + 𝜑 𝑝! + 𝑐!  
 
𝑝! −  𝑝! 1 − 𝜎 −  𝜑 + 𝑐!− 𝑐! − 𝜎𝜑𝑝! >  0  (3) 
 
Inequality (3) is more likely to be satisfied where 𝜑 is small and 𝑝! is 
large relative to 𝑝!. This implies that underinvestment in compliance at high-
risk firms will be most likely when: (i) there is dispersion in firms’ risk of 
prosecution relative to peers; and (ii) only a modest fraction of firms faces high 
risk of prosecution. 
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Appendix II: Delaware Oversight Duties Opinions 
Case Name Citation Year Judge Misconduct Procedural 
Posture 
Result 
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